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Fearless Girl Meets Charging Bull: 




This Article approaches the Fearless Girl/Charging Bull 
controversy as a case study in how copyright law regulates conditions of 
interaction between existing artistic works and new ones, in order to 
protect the value and integrity of the former without diminishing 
production of the latter. To assess the merits of sculptor Arturo 
DiModica’s legal claims in light of the policies underlying copyright law, 
I turn to the theory of intertextuality and the work of two narrative 
theorists—M.M. Bakhtin and Gerard Genette. Bakhtin’s concept of 
dialogism and Genette’s concept of hypertextuality are especially useful 
for understanding how the intertextual relationship between Fearless 
Girl and Charging Bull fits within the range of work-to-work and 
author-to-author relationships with which literary theory and copyright 
law are mutually concerned. Analyzing the Fearless Girl controversy 
through the concepts of dialogism and hypertextuality surfaces a clash 
between DiModica’s Continental view of copyright as a guarantor of 
authorial supremacy and the utilitarian orientation of U.S. copyright 
law, which gives authors less control over “second-degree” texts than 
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INTRODUCTION 
When dawn broke in Lower Manhattan on International Women’s Day in 
2017, New Yorkers and the world were introduced to a new piece of public 
sculpture in Bowling Green Park.1 The night before, contractors for State Street 
Global Advisors installed a life-sized sculpture of a pre-teen girl—head held high 
and arms akimbo—at the north end of the park.2 The sculpture, Kristen Visbal’s 
Fearless Girl, was purposely positioned directly in the path of an existing sculpture 
in the park, Arturo DiModica’s massive Charging Bull.3 
 
1. See Renae Merle, ‘Fearless Girl’ Ignites Debate About Art, Wall Street and the Lack  
of Female Executives, WASH. POST, May 12, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/fearless-girl-ignites-debate-about-art-wall-street-and-the-lack-of-female-executives/2017/
04/20/47ec6d52-239b-11e7-a1b3-faff0034e2de_story.html?utm_term=.c012644788d3 [ https://
perma.cc/TA9R-CX8M]; Frank Chaparro, The Statue of the ‘Fearless Girl’ Will Stare Down the Wall 
Street Bull for Another Year, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/fearless-
girl-statue-will-stay-on-wall-street-2017-3 [ https://perma.cc/JS2H-Z3WP]. 
2. See Lara Rutherford-Morrison, A “Fearless Girl” Statue Facing the Bull on Wall Street  
Sends a Powerful Message About Female Inclusivity in the Workplace, BUSTLE (Mar. 9,  2017),  
https://www.bustle.com/p/a-fearless-girl-statue-facing-the-bull-on-wall-street-sends-a-powerful-
message-about-female-inclusivity-in-the-workplace-43190 [ https://perma.cc/9YX5-4GLC]. 
3. See id. 
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Fearless Girl, which was originally intended for a one-week display,4 was 
created as the centerpiece of an advertising campaign for State Street by the McCann 
firm.5 In materials provided to the press following the installation, State Street 
explained that Fearless Girl was intended “to raise awareness and drive a 
conversation around the need to improve gender diversity in corporate leadership 
roles.”6 The sculpture installation was originally conceived as a vehicle for 
promoting State Street’s Gender Diversity Index Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF), 
which invests in companies that have a higher proportion of women in senior 
leadership than other companies of the same type.7 A plaque originally installed at 
the base of Fearless Girl, but since removed, read “Know the power of women in 
 
4. See Bourree Lam, Why People Are So Upset About Wall Street’s ‘Fearless Girl’, ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/04/fearless-girl-reactions/
523026/ [ https://perma.cc/PVS2-JFKH]. 
5. See David Griner, Fearless Girl’s Dominating Run at Cannes Ends with 4 Grand Prix and 18 
Total Lions, ADWEEK ( June 24, 2017), http://www.adweek.com/creativity/fearless-girls-dominating-
run-at-cannes-ends-with-4-grand-prix-and-18-total-lions/ [ https://perma.cc/SS6P-LQW7]. 
6. Fearless Girl Sends Powerful Message, ST. STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20171129114823/https://www.ssga.com/global/en/our-insights/ 
viewpoints/enhancing-gender-diversity-on-boards-emea.html ( last visited Nov. 29, 2017). 
7. See Jen Wieczner, Why the Fearless Girl Statue’s Controversial ‘SHE’ Plaque Was Removed, 
FORTUNE (Apr. 17, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/17/fearless-girl-statue-nyc-plaque-she-
nasdaq/ [ https://perma.cc/5Y75-9ZDF]; SPDR® SSGA Gender Diversity Index ETF, ST. STREET 
GLOBAL ADVISORS, https://us.spdrs.com/en/etf/spdr-ssga-gender-diversity-index-etf-SHE?fund 
SeoName=spdr-ssga-gender-diversity-index-etf-SHE [ https://perma.cc/T3JW-2DY4] ( last visited 
Nov. 15, 2018). 
Figure 1 Fearless Girl and Charging Bull
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leadership. SHE makes a difference.”8 SHE is the ticker symbol for State Street’s 
Gender Diversity Index ETF.9 
 
The public responded enthusiastically to Fearless Girl.10 A reporter for the 
Wall Street Journal described her as a “viral sensation.”11 Tourists snapped photos 
of their young daughters standing side-by-side with the bronze figure, imitating her 
defiant posture.12 
 
 8. Wieczner, supra note 7. State Street said that the removal of the plaque had nothing to do 
with DiModica’s complaint and was prompted instead by the sculpture’s induction into the New York 
City Department of Transportation’s public art project. Id. 
9. Id. A replacement plaque makes no mention of the fund. Id. 
10. See Nilanjana Roy, Why Aren’t There More Statues of Women?, FIN. TIMES, June 6, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/2f9137c6-49ff-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43 (discussing the range of 
responses to the statue, including some hostile and misogynistic ones); Suzanne Vranica, ’Fearless 
Girl’ Steals the Conversation, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/fearless-
girl-steals-the-conversation-1497864600 [ https://perma.cc/579B-QLU4] (describing Fearless Girl as a 
“viral sensation”). But see Nick Fugalio & Max Jaeger, Pissed-off Artist Adds Statue of Urinating Dog 
Next to ‘Fearless Girl’, N.Y. POST, May 29, 2017, http://nypost.com/2017/05/29/pissed-off-artist-
adds-statue-of-urinating-dog-next-to-fearless-girl/ [ https://perma.cc/6WPQ-7PJ7]; Ginia Bellafante, 
The False Feminism of ‘Fearless Girl’, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
03/16/nyregion/fearless-girl-statue-manhattan.html?_r=0 [ https://perma.cc/72F6-FJM8]. 
11. Vranica, supra note 10. 
12. See Karen Brill, What This Artist Got Wrong About the Fearless Girl Statue, 
ARCHITECTURAL DIG. (May 31, 2017), http://www.architecturaldigest.com/story/wall-street-bull-
fearless-girl-statue [ https://perma.cc/MRX5-JBG6] (reproducing a photo from a parental tweet). 
Figure 2 Original Fearless Girl Plaque
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DiModica, however, did not share the warm sentiment and was vocal about 
his displeasure. At a press conference, he derided the installation of Fearless Girl as 
an “advertising trick.”13 His attorneys fired off a letter to New York Mayor Bill De 
Blasio demanding that the interloping sculpture be removed.14 They accused State 
Street of violating DiModica’s copyright by making a “deliberate choice . . . to 
exploit and to appropriate the Charging Bull through the placement of Fearless 
Girl.”15 Mayor De Blasio weighed in on Twitter and charged DiModica with 
perpetuating the sexist exclusivity the sculpture was meant to challenge: “Men who 
don’t like women taking up space are exactly why we need the Fearless Girl.”16 
The controversy over Fearless Girl, which layers emotionally charged gender 
politics over emotionally charged aesthetic ones, generated a flood of publicity for 
Fearless Girl (and State Street) across traditional and social media.17 Three months 
after Fearless Girl’s debut, McCann swept the annual awards at the Cannes Lion 
International Festival of Creativity.18 The sculpture’s run was initially extended until 
February 2018,19 which came and went with no change to the installation. The 
 
13. Merle, supra note 1. 
14. Letter from Norman Siegel, Partner, Siegel Teitelbaum & Evans, LLP, and Steven Hyman, 
Partner, McLaughlin & Stern, LLP, to The Honorable Bill de Blasio (Apr. 11, 2017),  
https://www.scribd.com/document/344998311/Letter-to-Mayor-DeBlasio-on-Charging-Bull-vs-
Fearless-Girl [ hereinafter DiModica Demand Letter]. 
15. Id. at 2. In addition to raising copyright claims, DiModica alleged trademark infringement. 
Id. at 3. The trademark claim is beyond the scope of this Article. 
16. Mark Moore, De Blasio Defends ‘Fearless Girl’ Statue, N.Y. POST, Apr. 12, 2017,  
http://nypost.com/2017/04/12/de-blasio-defends-fearless-girl-statue/ [https://perma.cc/6N9H-
S5Y8]. 
17. See supra notes 1–10. 
18. See Griner, supra note 5 (“It’s official: Fearless Girl is one of the most highly honored 
campaigns in the history of the Cannes Lion International Festival of Creativity.”). 
19. See Moore, supra note 16. 
Figure 3 Tourist Photos: Fearless Girls
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current plan is to move Fearless Girl closer to the New York Stock Exchange by 
the end of 2018—not in response to DiModica’s complaints, but because the 
crowds constantly milling around the two works create a public safety risk in light 
of heavy traffic nearby.20 Charging Bull might also be moved, but it is unclear 
whether the two sculptures are destined for continuing confrontation.21 
This Article approaches the Fearless Girl/Charging Bull controversy as a case 
study in how copyright law regulates conditions of interaction between existing 
artistic works and new ones, in order to protect the value and integrity of the former 
without diminishing production of the latter.22 To assess the merits of DiModica’s 
copyright claims in light of the policies underlying copyright law, I turn to the theory 
of intertextuality23 and the work of two narrative theorists—M.M. Bakhtin24 and 
Gerard Genette.25 Although the concept of intertextuality has its roots in literary 
theory, it isn’t (and needn’t be) exclusive to the study of literature.26 As Bakhtin 
reminds us, “dialogic relationships in the broad sense are also possible among 
different intelligent phenomena, provided that these phenomena are expressed in 
some semiotic material.”27 Because intertextuality is a feature of semiosis beyond 
 
20. Sarah Cascone, From ‘Charging Bull’ to the Bull Market: ‘Fearless Girl’ Heads to the New 
York Stock Exchange, ARTNET NEWS (Apr. 19, 2018), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/fearless-
girl-new-york-stock-exchange-1269851 [https://perma.cc/CU3J-JN27]. 
21. Id. 
22. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(stating that the Copyright Act is structured to achieve a “difficult balance between the interests of 
authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, 
and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other”). 
23. Theorists of intertextuality view texts relationally rather than as closed systems. See  
María Jesús Martínez Alfaro, Intertextuality: Origins and Development of the Concept, 18 ATLANTIS 268 
(1996). The classic definition of the term comes from Julia Kristeva’s reading of Bakhtin: “[E]ach word 
(text) is an intersection of words (texts) where at least one other word (text) can be read. . . . [A]ny text 
is the absorption and transformation of another.” Julia Kristeva, Word, Dialogue and Novel, in THE 
KRISTEVA READER 37 (Toril Moi ed., 1986). Dialogism and hypertextuality as analytic concepts rest 
on the principle that “[a]uthors of literary works do not just select words from a language system, they 
select plots, generic features, aspects of character, images, ways of narrating, even phrases and sentences 
from previous literary texts and from the literary tradition.” GRAHAM ALLEN, INTERTEXTUALITY 11 
(Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 2d ed. 2011). 
24. M.M. BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY’S POETICS (Caryl Emerson ed. & trans., 
Univ. of Minnesota Press 1984) [ hereinafter BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY’S POETICS]; 
M.M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael 
Holquist trans., Univ. of Texas Press 1981) [hereinafter BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION]. 
25. GÉRARD GENETTE, PALIMPSESTS (Channa Newman & Claude Doubinsky trans., 1997). 
26. See ALLEN, supra note 23, at 169 (“Intertextuality, as a term, has not been restricted to 
discussions of the literary arts. It is found in discussions of cinema, painting, music, architecture, 
photography and in virtually all cultural and artistic productions. Despite the common-sense association 
between literature and the word ‘text,’ we need only remember the connection between the early 
articulations of intertextuality and the development of Saussure’s notions concerning semiology to make 
intertextuality’s use in studies of non-literary art forms understandable.”). 
27. BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY’S POETICS, supra note 24, at 184–85. 
First to Printer_Bridy (1) (Do Not Delete) 1/28/2019  1:42 PM 
2019] FEARLESS GIRL MEETS CHARGING BULL 299 
philology, textual theory can legitimately be brought to bear on works of visual art, 
including in this case sculpture.28 
Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism and Genette’s concept of hypertextuality are 
especially useful for understanding how the intertextual relationship between 
Fearless Girl and Charging Bull fits within the range of work-to-work and author-
to-author relationships with which literary theory and copyright law are mutually 
concerned.29 Analyzing the Fearless Girl controversy through these concepts 
surfaces a clash between DiModica’s Continental view of copyright as a guarantor 
of authorial supremacy and the more utilitarian, public orientation of U.S. copyright 
law, which gives authors less control over the production of secondary texts than 
DiModica would like.30 My principal argument is that U.S. copyright law is 
hospitable to intertextuality by design—much more so than Continental author’s 
rights law, which encodes what Bakhtin would characterize as a monologic 
aesthetics centered on the work as an extension of authorial personality.31 By giving 
narrow scope to moral rights and broad scope to fair use, in particular to critical 
and transformative secondary uses, U.S. copyright law limits the ability of artists like 
DiModica to control the public’s perception of their works by dictating the terms 
on which other artists interact with them. 
Part I begins by situating Bakhtin’s and Genette’s work on intertextuality 
within the broader frame of the poststructuralist discourse on authorship. I argue 
in Part I that Bakhtin and Genette describe what authors do with/in texts in terms 
that mesh comfortably with copyright’s definition of authorship as intentional 
creativity. After “reading” Fearless Girl (through Genette) as a “hypertext” of 
Charging Bull, I conclude Part I with the proposition that copyright defines the 
 
28. Cf. Deborah J. Haynes, Bakhtin and the Visual Arts, in A COMPANION TO ART THEORY 
295 (Paul Smith & Carolyn Wilde eds., 2002) (“Bakhtin’s ideas—answerability, dialogue, monologism, 
polyphony, outsideness, chronotope, the carnivalesque, unfinalizability, and heteroglossia, to name but 
a few—not only offer scholars categories for aesthetics, but also for analyzing visual arts.”). 
29. The nexus between intertextuality and copyright law is most obvious in cases where one 
author borrows protectable expression from another author’s copyrighted work and incorporates that 
expression into a “secondary” work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002) (giving the owner of a copyright the 
exclusive right to reproduce the work in copies and to prepare derivative works based on the 
copyrighted work). 
30. See generally Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy 
in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1994) (discussing 
the ways in which the commodity-based U.S. copyright system differs fundamentally from its 
personality-based Continental counterpart). But see Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary 
Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TULANE L. REV. 991 (1990) (arguing, based on 
historical documents from the revolutionary period, that philosophical differences between the French 
and U.S. copyright systems have been exaggerated). 
31. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall offers an extended exposition of the conception of copyright as a 
guarantor of authorial supremacy and finds fault with U.S. copyright law for failing to give authors the 
control she believes they deserve by virtue of their intimate connection to their works. See ROBERTA 
ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY (2010). I take a different view, believing that limits 
on authorial control are a strength of the U.S. system and a necessary condition for fulfilling copyright’s 
constitutional purpose of promoting progress in the arts. 
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conditions of artistic production by regulating the intertextual acts of second-degree 
authors like Kristen Visbal. 
Parts II and III explore DiModica’s perspective on the public installation of 
Fearless Girl, the cultural significance of Charging Bull, and the legal entitlement of 
artists to control the public reception of their works. Part IV turns to Bakhtin’s 
concepts of monologic and dialogic textuality to explain both DiModica’s 
philosophy of authorship and his expectations of copyright. In Part IV, I argue that 
DiModica’s monologic aesthetic philosophy aligns better with the author-centric 
Continental copyright tradition than with the more public-minded American 
tradition. 
Part V develops the argument that U.S. copyright law encodes the principle 
that cultural production is inherently dialogic and intertextual. By defining a range 
of second-degree works and second-degree uses, the Copyright Act explicitly 
accommodates intertextuality in the interest of furthering the constitutional 
objective of promoting artistic progress. Part VI analyzes DiModica’s moral rights 
and derivative work claims on their merits and concludes that DiModica wants 
copyright to regulate intertextuality in ways that it isn’t designed to do. 
I. SCHRÖDINGER’S AUTHOR 
The primary challenge in marshaling insights from poststructuralist literary 
theory to analyze problems in copyright lies in the disciplines’ very different 
understandings of authorship. Copyright as a legal regime is centered on the author, 
who is regarded as the originator or mastermind of her text.32 DiModica’s legal claim 
against State Street arises from his status as the creator of a protectable “work of 
authorship.”33 Poststructuralist theory, in contrast, is largely concerned with the 
displacement or dethroning of the author. In the work of Roland Barthes, for 
example, the author-as-father (of the work) has been supplanted by “the modern 
scriptor [who] is born simultaneously with the text.”34 For Michel Foucault, “the 
author does not precede the work; he is a certain functional principle . . . by which 
one impedes . . . the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and 
recomposition of fiction.”35 As a unified locus of aesthetic intention and creative 
 
32. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884) (stating that being 
an “‘author’ involves originating, making, producing, as the inventive or master mind, the thing which 
is to be protected” and defining the author as “the person who effectively is . . . the cause of the 
[work]”). 
33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress power to grant limited exclusive rights  
to “authors . . . in their writings”); 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990) (providing that “copyright protection 
subsists . . . in original works of authorship”); Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 56 (“Under the acts of congress 
designed to give effect to this section, the persons who are to be benefited are divided into two 
classes—authors and inventors.”). 
34. ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT 145 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977). 
35. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE FOUCAULT READER 118–19 (Paul Rabinow ed., Pantheon 
Books 1984). 
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productivity, the author is dead in the world of poststructuralism but alive and well 
in the world of copyright.36 
Bakhtin and Genette are attractive mediators for this interdisciplinary project 
because they can be read to bridge the seemingly wide gap between literary theory 
and copyright when it comes to the treatment of authors and artistic works. They 
articulate sophisticated but pragmatic theories of textuality that neither fetishize nor 
abandon the author as an organizing subjectivity and a source of textual meaning.37 
For them, the author is like Schrödinger’s cat: simultaneously dead and alive.38 Their 
thinking about the relationship between authors and texts partakes of what Michael 
Baxandall called “skeptical intentionalism”—the recognition that we unavoidably 
encounter and think about works of art “as products of purposeful activity, and 
therefore caused,” even when we recognize the complexity of that causation and 
don’t subscribe to traditional theories of aesthetic history and influence.39 Adopting 
the skeptical intentionalist perspective is helpful given that copyright law 
conceptualizes the work of art as the manifestation of an author’s creative labor40 
and vests legal rights in the person of the author.41 
 
36. See BARTHES, supra note 34, at 145 (“The Author is thought to nourish the book, which is to 
say that he exists before it, thinks, suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of antecedence as a father 
to his child. In complete contrast, the modern scriptor is born simultaneously with the text, is in no 
way equipped with a being preceding or exceeding the writing, is not the subject with the book as a 
predicate; there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every text is eternally written here and 
now.”) (emphasis in original); FOUCAULT, supra note 35, at 118–19 (“We are accustomed . . . to saying 
that the author is the genial creator of a work in which he deposits, with infinite wealth and generosity, 
an inexhaustible world of significations . . . . The truth is quite the contrary: the author is not an 
indefinite source of significations which fill a work; the author does not precede the work; he is a 
certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by 
which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, 
and recomposition of fiction.”). 
37. With respect to the question of authorship, Graham Allen reads Genette as neither a proper 
structuralist nor a proper poststructuralist to the extent that he emphasizes authorial intention. See 
ALLEN, supra note 23, at 104 (“[Genette’s] emphasis on authorial intention is not only contrary to 
poststructuralist theory and practice but also runs counter to the major thrust of structuralism.”). Allen 
views the author in Bakhtin’s world as a voice behind the text but not attempting to control it. Id. at 23. 
38. Schrödinger’s cat is the name of a famous thought experiment in quantum physics: “The 
cat is imagined as enclosed in a box with a radioactive source and a poison that will be released when 
the source (unpredictably) emits radiation, the cat being considered (according to quantum mechanics) 
to be simultaneously both dead and alive until the box is opened and the cat observed. Schrödinger 
conceived of it as a thought experiment to illustrate (or ridicule) an interpretation of the quantum-
mechanical superposition of states (associated with Niels Bohr), according to which the quantum state 
of a particle could not be known until an observation was made; prior to that it had to be  
described physically in terms of all possible states.” Schrödinger, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY,  
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/172599 ( last visited Jan. 21, 2019). 
39. MICHAEL BAXENDALL, PATTERNS OF INTENTION: ON THE HISTORICAL EXPLANATION 
OF PICTURES vi (1985). Baxendall also recognizes, however, that “once we start inferring causes and 
intention in a picture we are doing something that is obviously very precarious indeed.” Id. 
40. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (“The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.”). 
41. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1978) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in 
the author or authors of the work.”). For an extended exploration of the varied nature of personhood 
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Both Bakhtin and Genette view the products of authorship as reliant on, and 
inevitably inflected with, both the author’s voice and the voices of others. To be an 
author for them is by definition to engage in both intentional and unintentional 
intertextual acts.42 For Bakhtin, intertextuality is an intrinsic property of language 
because the words a writer chooses “are already populated with the social intentions 
of others.”43 The writer “compels them to serve his own new intentions, to serve a 
second master.”44 In this sense, all textuality is intertextuality; no word is born  
anew in any text, and no text is born in a cultural vacuum. To quote Julia Kristeva, 
who first introduced Bakhtin’s work to an anglophone audience, “Bakhtin 
considers . . . the text as an absorption of and a reply to another text.”45 Similarly 
for Genette, “there is no literary work that does not evoke (to some extent and 
according to how it is read) some other literary work,”46 making every text to a 
greater or lesser extent “a text in the second degree.”47 
Both Bakhtin and Genette are interested in the open, assimilative nature of 
texts (works) and in text-to-text (work-to-work) interaction as the foundation of 
artistic production and the engine of stylistic and generic evolution. Under the 
rubric of hypertextuality, Genette describes an intertextual relationship particularly 
relevant to the Fearless Girl/Charging Bull controversy.48 In a hypertextual 
relationship, the author of a later text (or hypertext) “grafts” a new work onto an 
earlier one (the hypotext).49 One of several forms that grafting can take is 
“continuation,” wherein the author of a hypertext extends or completes the 
hypotext from which it is derived.50 The continued hypotext is usually a work that 
its author left unfinished for one reason or another.51 Sometimes, as is the case with 
 
interests in intellectual property law, see Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors 
in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998). 
42. Jill Felicity Durey argues that theorists of intertextuality interpreting Bakhtin have tended to 
ignore or downplay the aspects of his work that describe dialogism as a relationship between authors 
and not just between texts. See Jill Felicity Durey, The State of Play and Interplay in Intertextuality, 25 
STYLE 616, 617 (1991) (“The essence of his theory lies in the concept of a supposed dialogue between 
the novelist and earlier writers, not just between the texts themselves, as subsequent theorists have 
seemed to think.”). In the same vein, María Jesús Martínez Alfaro refers to the “textualization of 
Bakhtin” in Kristeva’s reading of his work. Alfaro, supra note 23, at 276. 
43. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION, supra note 24, at 300. 
44. Id. 
45. Kristeva, supra note 23, at 39. 
46. GENETTE, supra note 25, at 9. 
47. Id. at 5. 
48. See id. (“By hypertextuality I mean any relationship uniting a text B (which I shall call the 
hypertext) to an earlier text A (I shall, of course, call it the hypotext), upon which it is grafted in a 
manner that is not commentary.”). 
49. Id. As examples of hypertexts, Genette offers James Joyce’s Ulysses and Virgil’s Aeneid, both 
of which extend and are derived from Homer’s Odyssey. Ulysses tells the same story as Homer’s Odyssey 
in a different way (i.e., in novel form, set in twentieth-century Dublin), and Virgil’s Aeneid tells a 
different story (i.e., that of Aeneas, not Odysseus) in the same way (i.e., epic form). See id. at 5–6. 
50. Id. at 161 (explaining the historical origins of the concept of a continuation). 
51. See id. at 162 (“When a work is left unfinished by reason of the death of its author or some 
other cause of final abandonment, continuation consists in finishing the work in the author’s stead.”). 
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Fearless Girl, the hypertext can be the continuation of a hypotext that its author 
actually views as finished and complete.52 The author of such a hypertext reopens 
the putatively complete hypotext and completes it according to her own intentions. 
Genette refers to the continuation of an apparently finished text as a sequel or 
prolongation.53 
The author of a hypertext can operate with varying degrees of “faithfulness” 
to the hypotext she chooses to engage.54 As a continuator, the author of a hypertext 
can be imitative, corrective, iconoclastic, or refutative—or some combination of 
those.55 An unfaithful continuation—the category into which I would place Fearless 
Girl as a hypertext of Charging Bull—aspires not to complete the hypotext on its 
own terms but to change or invert its significance: “[O]ne can just as easily reverse 
the significance of a text by giving it a sequel that refutes it as by modifying its 
setting, its tone, or its plot.”56 In Genette’s framework (implicitly invoking Jacques 
Dérrida), the unfaithful continuation operates as a “supplement” to the hypotext it 
continues: it simultaneously augments and displaces the earlier work.57 
Neither Genette nor Bakhtin considers the dialogic and hypertextual acts of 
authors, whether intentional or not, in terms of property rights—as potential acts 
of trespass or misappropriation. Neither understands authorship legalistically, in 
terms of the possessive individualism that underlies DiModica’s attitude toward 
 
52. GENETTE, supra note 25, at 175 (“The function of the continuation, however, is not always 
to complete a work that has been left manifestly and, as it were, officially unfinished. One can always 
decide that a work which is finished and published as such by its author is nevertheless in need of a 
prolongation or completion.”). 
53. Id. at 162 (“The sequel . . . consists in exploiting the success of a work that in its own time 
was considered complete, and in setting it into motion with new episodes.”). 
54. Confusingly, Genette uses the term “transtextuality” as the umbrella term for all intertextual 
interactions and “intertextuality” more specifically to refer to a relationship in which one text quotes 
from or alludes to another. See id. at 1–2 (acknowledging that his use of “intertextuality” is more 
restrictive than Julia Kristeva’s now paradigmatic use of the term). Most theorists use intertextuality as 
the umbrella term to denote “the structural relations between two or more texts.” Margarete Landwehr, 
Literature and the Visual Arts: Questions of Influence and Intertextuality, C. LITERATURE, Summer 2002, 
at 1, 2. I will follow that convention, treating Genette’s concept of hypertexuality as a subtype of 
intertextuality. 
55. See, e.g., GENETTE, supra note 25, at 162 (describing a continuator who “imitate[s] as closely 
as possible the style of the unfinished text”); id. at 175 (describing “the category of the unfaithful or 
corrective continuation”); id. at 198 (describing “the sequel that refutes”); id. at 199 (describing the 
“iconoclastic continuator”); id. at 200 (describing “a murderous or parricidal continuation”). 
56. Id. at 198. 
57. See id. at 202 (“By virtue of a well-known ambiguity, the term supplement bears a more 
ambitious significance: the postscript here is wholly prepared to substitute for—that is, to displace and 
therefore to erase—that which it completes.”); see also Robert Bernasconi, The Supplement, in JACQUES 
DERRIDA: KEY CONCEPTS 19, 19 (Claire Colebrook ed., 2015) (“In Of Grammatology Derrida took up 
the term supplément from his reading of both Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Claude Lévi-Strauss and used 
it to formulate what he called ‘the logic of supplementarity.’ . . . Rousseau can be found writing the 
ambiguous term supplément and its cognates into his narratives. The supplement is an addition from 
the outside, but it can also be understood as supplying what is missing and in this way is already inscribed 
within that to which it is added.”). 
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Charging Bull and his displeasure about Fearless Girl.58 When authors like 
DiModica are embarrassed or upset by unauthorized secondary uses of their work, 
they turn to copyright as the domain of legally enforceable authorial prerogatives. 
In this sense, copyright defines not only the legal conditions for the publication and 
distribution of cultural works, but also the conditions for second-degree artistic 
production. Bakhtin and Genette offer copyright scholars a way of understanding 
and describing how the American copyright system (in contrast with its Continental 
counterparts) encodes intertextuality as a defining condition of authorship. 
II. DIMODICA’S BEEF 
DiModica’s beef with Fearless Girl does not arise from a garden variety case 
of piracy or impermissibly lavish quotation. Fearless Girl copies nothing from 
Charging Bull and is therefore not actionably similar to DiModica’s work.59 At the 
same time, however, it seems plausible to think of State Street’s actions as a form 
of appropriation: State Street and Visbal conscripted Charging Bull for use in their 
own semiotic project, engaging in what Genette would have classified as an 
unfaithful continuation of Charging Bull.60 Fearless Girl relies on Charging Bull to 
signify youthful feminine resolve in the face of entrenched masculine power.61 It 
relies on Charging Bull to “drive a conversation” about gender equity that State 
Street and Visbal designed it to instigate.62 An assertion in DiModica’s demand letter 
 
58. See generally C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 
(Oxford Univ. Press Wynford ed. 2011). 
59. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(explaining that a plaintiff seeking to prove infringement of the reproduction right must prove both 
actual copying and substantial similarity between the defendant’s work and protected expression in the 
plaintiff’s work). 
60. See GENETTE, supra note 25, at 177 (discussing continuations that do not seek to do what 
the continuator imagines the author of the hypotext would have done but instead “add to their hypotext 
only the prolongation and the conclusion that the continuator thinks it fit (or profitable) to adduce”) 
(emphasis added). 
61. There is a growing body of both case law and scholarly literature on appropriation art as a 
method and a movement. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 
F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); CUTTING ACROSS MEDIA: APPROPRIATION ART, INTERVENTIONIST 
COLLAGE, AND COPYRIGHT LAW (Kembrew McLeod & Rudolf Kuenzli eds., Duke Univ. Press 2011); 
Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and Post-Modernism, 11 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1992); Marci A. Hamilton, Appropriation Art and the Imminent Decline in Authorial 
Control over Copyrighted Works, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 93 (1994); William M. Landes, 
Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 
(2000). The category is defined by a later artist’s wholesale, literal copying of an earlier artist’s work. See 
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 699 (“The Tate Gallery has defined appropriation art as ‘the more or less direct 
taking over into a work of art a real object or even an existing work of art.’”). My goal in this Article is 
to examine the phenomenon of artistic appropriation conceived more broadly, within the theoretical 
frames of dialogism and intertextuality. 
62. Ironically, within a year of Fearless Girl’s installation, State Street Corporation entered into 
a five million dollar settlement with the United States Department of Labor over wage discrimination 
claims brought by more than 300 female employees. See Jordyn Holman, Bank Behind  
Fearless Girl Statue Settles U.S. Gender Pay Dispute, BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 5, 2017),  
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-05/bank-behind-fearless-girl-statue-settles-u-s-
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that Charging Bull is a “necessary element” of State Street’s politically engaged art 
project is to that extent correct.63 As DiModica’s letter fairly points out, Fearless 
Girl is only fearless in relation to the implicit threat embodied by Charging Bull.64 
Without Charging Bull as an interlocutor, Fearless Girl is just a statue of a little girl 
standing with her chin in the air and her hands on her hips. 
Fearless Girl supplements Charging Bull in the Derridean sense of a surplus 
that displaces what it augments.65 Its proximity to Charging Bull expands the visual 
frame around Charging Bull and alters how the public encounters and understands 
DiModica’s sculpture. With Fearless Girl positioned as it is, the viewer is dissuaded 
from encountering Charging Bull as a separate work with independent 
significance.66 Instead, visitors to Bowling Green are drawn into a visual narrative 
that incorporates Charging Bull as an adversarial figure. The viewer “reads” the two 
works together, in dialogue with each other, more or less as a composite work. 
According to DiModica’s demand letter, State Street and Visbal encouraged viewers 
to perceive Charging Bull and Fearless Girl as a unitary work by creating “visual 
links” between the two sculptures: both works are made of bronze with a similar 
patina; in addition, State Street extended the cobblestone apron on which Charging 
Bull sits so that Fearless Girl and Charging Bull are connected by the ground on 
which they both stand.67 In his letter, DiModica denounces the “inextricable link” 
between the two sculptures—a link that State Street freely admits it intended to 
create.68 
DiModica argues that Fearless Girl has turned Charging Bull into “a symbol 
of male chauvinism.”69 That symbolism, his lawyers say, runs counter to the 
“positive message” DiModica means his sculpture to convey.70 He wants the public 
to see Charging Bull as “a symbol of the hope of the American people for the 
 
gender-pay-dispute [ https://web.archive.org/web/20181230125231/https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2017-10-05/bank-behind-fearless-girl-statue-settles-u-s-gender-pay-dispute] (“The 
Labor Department alleged that women in senior leadership positions at Boston-based State Street 
received lower base salaries, bonus pay and total compensation since at least December 2010.”). 
63. DiModica Demand Letter, supra note 14, at 2. This assertion is relevant to DiModica’s claim 
that State Street violated his right to prepare derivative works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2002). The merits 
of DiModica’s derivative work claim are discussed infra Section VI.B. 
64. DiModica Demand Letter, supra note 14, at 1 (“The statute of the young girl becomes the 
‘Fearless Girl’ only because of the Charging Bull: the work is incomplete without Mr. DiModica’s 
Charging Bull . . . .”). 
65. See Bernasconi, supra note 57, at 19 (“The supplement is an addition from the outside, but 
it can also be understood as supplying what is missing and in this way is already inscribed within that 
to which it is added.”). 
66. It remains possible to view Charging Bull as a freestanding work if the viewer stands 
between Fearless Girl and Charging Bull with his or her back to Fearless Girl. Other sightlines from 
the street to Charging Bull that exclude Fearless Girl are also possible. 
67. DiModica Demand Letter, supra note 14, at 2. 
68. Id. 
69. Merle, supra note 1. 
70. DiModica Demand Letter, supra note 14, at 1. 
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future.”71 Predictably, Visbal views the sculptures and their symbolism differently. 
She told reporters that she doesn’t believe Fearless Girl “detract[s] from Charging 
Bull and all [it] stands for but, rather, calls for collaboration between men and 
women in decision making.”72 Whatever one thinks the two works signify in terms 
of patriotism or capitalism73 or feminism, there can be little question that they 
signify something different together than they would apart.74 Insofar as Visbal’s 
vision for the Fearless Girl/Charging Bull composite work clashes with DiModica’s 
vision for Charging Bull as an independent work, Visbal is the quintessential 
unfaithful continuator. 
Although the two works stand apart, Fearless Girl and Charging Bull are 
counterposed in a visual dialogue of which DiModica wants no part. Charging Bull 
was made to stand alone, and DiModica would prefer to keep it that way. He appeals 
to the law of copyright as a way to control the public presentation and reception of 
Charging Bull, so that he can prevent the work of another artist from interacting 
visually and symbolically with his own.75 The primary relief DiModica wants is 
relocation of Fearless Girl to clear the sightlines leading to Charging Bull, thereby 
restoring the public’s ability to focus on his work as a solitary object with a 
significance all its own.76 He appears to believe, however misguidedly, that his 
copyright in the sculpture can be leveraged into a monopoly on both the public’s 
attention and his work’s physical context. By enforcing his copyright in Charging 
Bull, DiModica seeks to enforce his vision of the work and to prevent others from, 
in his view, co-opting his artistic production to serve their own political and 
aesthetic ends.77 He wants copyright to restore Charging Bull’s—and his own—
independence from other works and other authors. 
 
71. Id. 
72. Merle, supra note 1. 
73. Mayor De Blasio described Charging Bull—not flatteringly—as “a celebration of unfettered 
capitalism.” Id. Others, too, may see it that way; during the Occupy Wall Street protests, the police had 
to barricade the sculpture to protect it from being vandalized by demonstrators. Id. 
74. The question of who gets to decide what a work means has generated a wide and deep 
literature on the role of the reader relative to that of the author in the interpretation of texts. See generally 
TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 54–90 (1983) (tracing the development 
of theories of textual interpretation from phenomenology through hermeneutics to contemporary 
reader-response theory). Copyright scholars have explored—and continue to explore—the ways in 
which copyright theory and jurisprudence can benefit from a more sophisticated approach to 
readership and audience. See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader 
Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445 (2008); Zahr K. Said, A Transactional Theory of the Reader in 
Copyright Law, 102 IOWA L. REV. 605 (2017); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998). 
75. DiModica’s letter claims violations of his reproduction, derivative work, and distribution 
rights under section 106 of the Copyright Act and his right of integrity under section 106A, the Visual 
Artists Rights Act (VARA). DiModica Demand Letter, supra note 14, at 3. 
76. See id. at 4. DiModica also wants monetary damages. Id. 
77. As of this writing, DiModica has not actually sued the City or State Street. His lawyer has 
said he hopes to settle the matter out of court. Isaac Kaplan, Fearless Girl Face-off Poses a New Question: 
Does the Law Protect an Artist’s Message?, ARTSY (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-
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III. AN ARTIST FULL OF (HIS) BULL 
To learn the details of the story behind Charging Bull is to realize that there 
is, in fact, a curious double standard at work in DiModica’s critique of State Street’s 
motives and actions.78 For all of DiModica’s professions of artistic high-mindedness 
and purity of intention, it turns out that Charging Bull’s origin story has more in 
common with Fearless Girl’s than DiModica might care to admit. That story begins 
in Manhattan in the 1980s—“a brash decade in which excess was the norm and 
ostentatious displays of wealth and power were celebrated in pop culture and among 
Manhattan’s elite.”79 
According to DiModica, the inspiration for Charging Bull came to him in the 
days following the stock market crash of 1987, the country’s worst economic shock 
since the Great Depression.80 On his own initiative and at his own expense, he 
created Charging Bull to represent “the strength, power and hope of the American 
people for the future” at a time of economic uncertainty and instability.81 The  
18-foot-long, three-and-a-half-ton bronze statue took DiModica two years to 
make.82 Ten days before Christmas in 1989, he and a team of movers loaded 
Charging Bull onto a flatbed truck at his SoHo studio and drove it down Wall Street, 
delivering it under cover of night to the plaza in front of the New York Stock 
Exchange.83 DiModica had no permit from the city or the Stock Exchange to install 
the sculpture, making Charging Bull’s public debut an act of trespass.84 Executives 
at the Stock Exchange didn’t want anything to do with it.85 They initially called the 
police, who lacked the capacity to move the massive sculpture. Later, they hired 
contractors to haul Charging Bull off to an impound yard in Queens.86 DiModica 
subsequently partnered with community activists who were fans of the sculpture 
and successfully negotiated with the City to have it relocated to Bowling Green, 




78. In addition to calling Fearless Girl an “advertising trick,” DiModica was dismayed that State 
Street had not sought his permission before installing Fearless Girl on public property. See DiModica 
Demand Letter, supra note 14, at 4 (asserting that “Mr. DiModica’s permission was plainly required”). 
79. Jonathan Lemire, For Trump, the 1980s Still Hold Relevance, PATRIOT LEDGER, Jan. 2, 
2017, http://www.patriotledger.com/news/20170102/for-trump-1980s-still-hold-relevance  
[ https://perma.cc/TB5K-AF7A]. 
80. Bruce Lambert, Neighborhood Report: Lower Manhattan; A Campaign to Save a Bull,  
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/03/nyregion/neighborhood-report-
lower-manhattan-a-campaign-to-save-a-bull.html [https://perma.cc/NTQ5-QWKK]. 
81. Id. 
82. See Jeremy Olshan, Wall Street’s Famed Bronze Bull Arrived 25 Years Ago (Without 
Permission), MARKETWATCH (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/wall-streets-
famed-cast-bronze-bull-turns-25-2014-12-15 [https://perma.cc/9YED-AVB7]. 
83. Id. 
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Despite the daunting logistics, Charging Bull was actually not DiModica’s 
first—or even his second—unsolicited art delivery in Manhattan.88 Getting 
permission, it seems, is just for other people. As publicity stunts go, State Street 
appears to have learned a lesson from the master. Unlike DiModica, however, State 
Street got a permit from the city first.89 DiModica views Fearless Girl as a 
presumptuous interloper, but the City of New York, which actually owns the 
property on which it sits, does not. 
As for DiModica’s critique of State Street’s commercialism, that too should be 
taken with a grain of salt. In 1993, after Charging Bull had become a tourist 
attraction, DiModica tried to sell his “gift” to the city for $320,000.90 When the city 
declined, he offered to sell it to Merrill Lynch, which has a visually similar bull for 
its logo.91 When Merrill Lynch declined, DiModica threatened to sell and move the 
sculpture to a Las Vegas hotel unless some New Yorker met his price.92 In addition 
to trying to sell the sculpture itself, DiModica has used Charging Bull to sell other 
things. He holds trademark rights in a downsized, two-dimensional logo version of 
the sculpture, which is federally registered for use in connection with the sale of T-
shirts and ties.93 
The point of highlighting the irony in DiModica’s critique of State Street is not 
to brand him a hypocrite, but rather to suggest that the true source of his displeasure 
about Fearless Girl is something other than a deeply held, if quaint, conviction that 
commerce demeans art.94 After all, how can his outrage over Fearless Girl as an 
“advertising trick” be taken seriously in light of his own history as a showman and 
self-promoter? The more credible explanation is that he dislikes Fearless Girl for 
altering, through its very presence, the public’s perception of Charging Bull. That 
reason comes across more clearly in his demand letter to the City (which focuses on 
what Fearless Girl “does” to Charging Bull) than in his comments to the media 
(which focused on Fearless Girl as a marketing ploy). DiModica wants Fearless Girl 
to be removed not so much because he thinks the sculpture is inauthentic or “bad 
art,” but because its presence inclines viewers to experience and interpret his art in 
 
88. See Merle, supra note 1 (“Years before DiModica donated his iconic statue, he had developed 
a reputation for foisting gifts on New York that the city didn’t want. In 1977, again in the middle of the 
night, he reportedly dropped several marble statues in front of Rockefeller Center and in 1986 he 
sneaked a big bronze horse in front of Lincoln Center.”). 
89. Id. (reporting that the permit covers a one-year period). 
90. Lambert, supra note 80. 
91. Id.; see also The Mark Consists of a Design of a Bull, Registration No. 1,272,654 
(documenting Merrill Lynch’s federal registration of its bull logo). 
92. Lambert, supra note 80. 
93. See CHARGING BULL A DIMODICA NY 2003 NEW YORK, Registration  
No. 4,451,568; see also DiModica Demand Letter, supra note 14, at 3 (alleging trademark dilution). 
94. Given the consumerization of culture and the rise of mass media in the second half of the 
twentieth century, it is difficult to defend the notion of a stable conceptual and stylistic boundary 
between art and advertising. See generally JOAN GIBBONS, ART AND ADVERTISING 158 (2011) (arguing 
that the relationship between contemporary art and advertising is “highly elastic,” even though 
“essential distinctions between the two fields of practice remain”). 
First to Printer_Bridy (1) (Do Not Delete) 1/28/2019  1:42 PM 
2019] FEARLESS GIRL MEETS CHARGING BULL 309 
a way he doesn’t like. Simply put, Fearless Girl makes Charging Bull signify 
something that DiModica didn’t intend. The question is whether copyright law can, 
or should, give him the control and the remedy he wants. The answer to both 
questions, for reasons that I will explain in Part VI below, is no. 
IV. ARTISTIC BULLIES: AUTHORSHIP AS AESTHETIC MONOLOGISM 
DiModica turned to copyright as a way of policing the boundaries of his work, 
to prevent it from being recontextualized and incorporated into someone else’s 
artistic (and political) vision. Implicit in his understanding of the reach and purpose 
of copyright is what Bakhtin describes as a monologic aesthetics—a view of the 
relationship between author, language, and work that Bakhtin associates with the 
genres of epic and poetry.95 In The Dialogic Imagination, Bakhtin describes the 
monologic work as “a hermetic and self-sufficient whole . . . whose elements 
constitute a closed system presuming nothing beyond themselves, no other 
utterances.”96 In a monologic aesthetics, the consciousness of the author merges 
mystically with the language of the work: 
In poetic genres, artistic consciousness—understood as a unity of all the 
author’s semantic and expressive intentions—fully realizes itself within its 
own language . . . . The language of the poet is his language, he is utterly 
immersed in it, inseparable from it, he makes use of each form, each word, 
each expression according to its unmediated power to assign meaning (as 
it were, “without quotation marks”), that is, as a pure and direct expression 
of his own intention.97 
The monologic work is an aesthetic manifestation of the author’s personality 
and her desire to materialize personal intention through language. Considered in 
terms of its orientation to other works and authors, the monologic work is a “closed 
authorial monologue . . . that presumes only passive listeners beyond its own 
boundaries.”98 In the one-way communicative transaction between the author and 
the auditor, the auditor’s role is solely to discern what the author wants her to hear, 
bringing nothing of herself to the encounter. 
Bakhtin’s monologic poet-author is kin of the “Romantic author” whom 





95. For Bakhtin, poetry and prose are “the result of opposed tendencies.” Alfaro, supra note 23, 
at 274. He views the poetic genres as “centripetal and . . . associated with the unitary and the single.” 
Id. Novelistic prose, by contrast, is “centrifugal and leads to plurality and variation.” Id. 
96. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION, supra note 24, at 273. 
97. Id. at 285. 
98. Id. 
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imagined dominion over textual meaning.99 “The image of literature to be found in 
the ordinary culture,” Barthes wrote, 
is tyrannically centred on the author, his person, his life, his tastes, his 
passions. . . . The explanation of a work is always sought in the man or 
woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end, through the more 
or less transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice of a single person, the 
author, “confiding” in us.100 
Scholars including Martha Woodmansee, Mark Rose, and Peter Jaszi have 
explored the ways in which copyright law incorporates this hyper-individualized 
construct of authorship.101 My call on literary theory is for a different purpose—
one centered less on authors and more on (inter)relationships between works. I 
believe, as Peter Jaszi has ventured in his more recent scholarship, that U.S. 
copyright law is less wedded to the property assumptions underlying Romantic 
authorship than previous scholars (including Jaszi himself) have argued.102 Jaszi sees 
this as a recent development associated with the evolving jurisprudence of fair use, 
but I submit that it has really been true all along. Thinking about copyright through 
the framework of intertextuality rather than that of Romantic authorship helps 
prove this point. 
Bakhtin conceives of different authors and genres as differentially receptive to 
the reality that dialogism permeates language and texts. Whereas he associates 
monologism with poets and poetry, he associates dialogism with novelists and 
prose.103 Poems tend to be dominated by the poet’s singular voice, but novels are 
populated with different characters belonging to different discourse communities 
and speaking in different registers—often including a narrator who remains outside 
the action, on a discursive plane of her own.104 Bakhtin defines “double-voiced” 
 
99. See BARTHES, supra note 34, at 142–43 (“The author is a modern figure, a product of our 
society insofar as, emerging from the Middle Ages with English empiricism, French rationalism and the 
personal faith of the Reformation, it discovered the prestige of the individual, of, as it is more nobly 
put, the ‘human person.’”); FOUCAULT, supra note 35, at 101 (“The coming into being of the notion of 
‘author’ constitutes the privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas, knowledge, 
literature, philosophy and the sciences.”). 
100. BARTHES, supra note 34, at 143. 
101. See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993); 
Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 293 (1992); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 
1991 DUKE L.J. 455 (1991); Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the 
Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51 (1988); Martha Woodmansee, On the Author 
Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279 (1992); Martha Woodmansee,  
The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author,’ 17 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984). 
102. See Peter Jaszi, Is There Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?, 12 TUL. J. TECH. &  
INTELL. PROP. 105, 106 (2009) (arguing that elements of postmodernism “are beginning to seep into 
copyright theory and jurisprudence”). 
103. See supra note 95 (discussing the opposition Bakhtin posits between poetry and prose). 
104. See Alfaro, supra note 23, at 274 (“[I]n the monological genres the author subordinates all 
the voices present to his/her own intentions. . . . [T]he prose writer . . . allows each voice to keep its 
own integrity and independence.”). 
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(dialogic) discourse broadly as that which has “an orientation toward someone else’s 
discourse.”105 He offers parody as an example of an obviously double-voiced form: 
“[I]n all possible varieties of parodistic discourse the relationship between the 
author’s and the other person’s aspirations remains the same: these aspirations pull 
in different directions, in contrast to the unidirectional aspirations of [singled-voiced 
(monologic) discourse].”106 
Sometimes, as in parodies, the aspirations of the dialogic author are directly 
hostile to those of the other author or authors to whom she responds. In some 
instances, including parody, Bakhtin’s dialogic author shares with Genette’s 
unfaithful continuator both a desire to engage the voices of others and a critical 
orientation toward those voices and their utterances. In U.S. copyright law, as I will 
discuss in more detail in Part V, fair use doctrine accommodates intertextual 
showdowns of this type, where authors of copyrighted works are likely to oppose 
the use of their works in second-degree texts that they view as morally, politically, 
or aesthetically objectionable.107 
DiModica’s sense of artistic violation at the placement of Fearless Girl in 
juxtaposition to Charging Bull is readily legible within the frames of Bakhtinian 
monologism and the related construct of Romantic authorship. It is clear from 
DiModica’s letter to the city that he sees his work as having an intended message 
and symbolism that Fearless Girl impermissibly distorts: 
[T]he placement of the statue of the young girl in opposition to the 
Charging Bull has undermined the integrity of . . . the Charging Bull. The 
Charging Bull no longer carries a positive, optimistic message. Rather, it 
has been transformed into a negative force and a threat.108 
In his reaction to Fearless Girl, DiModica reveals his commitment to a 
monologic vison of his work that forecloses voices from the outside and admits 
only a single voice—his own. That commitment leads him to deny a panoply of 
intertextual echoes that viewers themselves might bring to their encounters with 
Charging Bull: the prehistoric cave drawing of a bull at Lascaux; Zeus in the form 
of a bull in the myth of Europa; Theseus and the Minotaur; Picasso’s famous “Bull” 
lithographs; or the running of the bulls in Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises—to 
name a few.109 Of course, none of these associations has anything to do with the 
“message” DiModica believes he is communicating in his work. Even without 
 
105. BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY’S POETICS, supra note 24, at 199. 
106. Id. at 194. 
107. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding that a bawdy rap 
parody of a classic rock-and-roll song was potentially fair use even though the holders of the copyright 
in the rock-and-roll song refused to give the parodists a license because the rightholders found the rap 
song distasteful). 
108. DiModica Demand Letter, supra note 14, at 3. 
109. I owe thanks to Ellen Burt for bringing some of these references to my attention and for 
emphasizing the extent to which DiModica’s work is “propped” on other famous bulls, whether he 
acknowledges those intertextual relationships or not. 
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Fearless Girl as his antagonist, DiModica would have no realistic hope of controlling 
how others see and think about Charging Bull. 
DiModica views his sculpture as bounded in a propertistic sense by his own 
understanding of its purpose and message. This view is consistent with the 
Continental model of authorship, which puts authorial intention at the center of the 
relationship between the reader and the text.110 The author is the authoritative (if 
not authoritarian) source of textual meaning: “The monologue,” Bakhtin asserts, “is 
finalized and deaf to the other’s response, does not expect it and does not 
acknowledge in it any decisive force. Monologue manages without the other 
[and] . . . pretends to be the ultimate word.”111 For Barthes, this closing of the text 
is an inevitable incident of imperial authorship: “To give the text an Author is to 
impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing.”112 
When the work is conceptualized as a closed system of signification, complete unto 
itself and belonging to the author, opening it up to new meanings through 
unauthorized modification or dialogic interaction with another work becomes a 
form of trespass or misappropriation. DiModica turns to copyright law to enforce 
a monologic model of authorship and the dominion he believes it should entail over 
both the physical and semiotic boundaries of his work. 
V. COPYRIGHTS AND INTERTEXTS 
U.S. copyright law has historically been attentive to the intertextuality inherent 
in artistic production. Courts deciding copyright cases have long recognized that no 
work is an island unto itself, and all works to a greater or lesser extent are texts in 
the second degree. An excerpt from Emerson v. Davies, decided in 1845, reads like 
an introduction to the theory of intertextuality: 
No man creates a new language for himself . . . in writing a book. He 
contents himself with the use of language already known and used and 
understood by others. No man writes exclusively from his own thoughts, 
unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of others. . . . If no book could 
be the subject of copy-right which was not new and original in the elements 
of which it is composed, there could be no ground for any copy-right in 
the modern times. . . . Virgil borrowed much from Homer; Bacon drew 
from earlier as well as contemporary minds; Coke exhausted all known 
 
110. Viewed schematically, the Continental tradition of author’s rights comes in two  
flavors: monism and dualism. See Netanel, supra note 30, at 21–22. Monism, which underpins German 
copyright law, is associated with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Id. at 21. Monists believe that 
author’s rights are exclusively personality rights, not property rights. Id. at 20. Dualism, which underpins 
French copyright law, is associated with the philosophy of Georg Hegel. Id. at 21. Dualists believe that 
author’s rights can be split into personality rights and property rights. Dualists view the property 
component of author’s rights as alienable. Id. For purposes of this project, the differences between the 
two strains are less important than what they share, namely the tenet that the artistic work is an 
extension of authorial personality and therefore cannot be properly understood without reference to 
authorial intention. See KWALL, supra note 31, at 40. 
111. BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY’S POETICS, supra note 24, at 293. 
112. BARTHES, supra note 34, at 147. 
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learning of his profession; and even Shakespeare and Milton, so justly and 
proudly our boast as the brightest originals would be found to have 
gathered much from the abundant stores of current knowledge and 
classical studies in their days.113 
The intertextuality inherent in the process of artistic production fundamentally 
complicates the task of determining the strength and reach of the copyright in any 
particular work.114 The Copyright Office registers “works” as unitary things, but in 
reality, the copyright in any given work is unevenly distributed; it doesn’t extend to 
elements borrowed from other works or the public domain.115 Accordingly, the 
infringement analysis demands that elements not original to the author—echoes of 
other voices and works within the text—be “filtered out,” leaving a residue of 
copyrightable expression.116 
At the same time, however, the cases recognize that the work as a whole may 
be more than the sum of its parts.117 Authorship can lie in the creative assembly of 
elements—for example, facts—that are not copyrightable in themselves.118 In 
Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., the Second Circuit 
considered the infringement claim of a Tibetan style carpet designer whose design 
for a “Floral Heriz” carpet was a modified mash-up of two existing designs 
(hypotexts) from the public domain.119 The court wrote that 
all creative works draw on the common wellspring that is the public 
domain. In this pool are not only elemental “raw materials,” like colors, 
letters, descriptive facts, and the catalogue of standard geometric forms, 
but also earlier works of art that, due to the passage of time or for other 
reasons, are no longer copyright protected.120 
Such imported, intertextual elements are not original to the second-degree 
author and cannot be claimed.121 After accounting for the significant amount of 
public domain material in the plaintiff’s design, the court in Tufenkian nevertheless 
held that the plaintiff had sufficiently modified the public domain designs to 
 
113. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436). 
114. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (discussing the 
difficulty of separating public domain elements in a copyrighted work from those original elements in 
which the author can legitimately claim authorship and ownership). 
115. See, e.g., Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 132 
(2d Cir. 2003) (“It is universally true, however, that even works which express enough originality to be 
protected also contain material that is not original, and hence that may be freely used by other 
designers.”). 
116. See, e.g., Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 325 
(6th Cir. 2004) (“The canonical statement of law is that non-protectible elements must be filtered out.”). 
117. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (explaining that 
individual facts are not copyrightable, but sufficiently original compilations of facts are). 
118. Id. 
119. See Tufenkian Imp., 338 F.3d at 129 (“He had composed the Heriz two years earlier by 
scanning into his computer two public domain images, one of the ‘Battilossi’ carpet (a Persian antique), 
the other of the ‘Blau’ carpet (an Indian Agra, designed by Dorris Blau).”). 
120. Id. at 132. 
121. Id. 
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support a copyright in his design (hypertext).122 Although the plaintiff’s copyright 
was relatively weak, the defendant was still liable for copying what little in the design 
was demonstrably original to the plaintiff.123 
Courts recognize, too, that intertextuality can be less intentional and  
overt, resulting from a kind of cultural osmosis that occurs imperceptibly  
when we experience works around us that please—and subconsciously  
inspire—us: “Everything registers somewhere in our memories,” Learned Hand 
wrote in Fred Fisher v. Dillingham, “and no one can tell what may evoke it.”124 The 
defendant in Fred Fisher, the famous composer Jerome Kern, testified that he had 
not consciously copied an eight-note ostinato in the chorus of his song “Kalua” 
from the plaintiff’s song “Dardanella.”125 The court believed him but still found 
that he had not independently created the sequence.126 Fred Fisher and a long line 
of “subconscious copying” cases attest that even when artists sincerely believe they 
are making something original and speaking only in their own voices, they are 
creating in the second degree, relying on pre-existing works to compose their 
own.127 As the Second Circuit said of the defendants in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn 
Pictures Corp., “they might quite honestly forget what they took; nobody knows the 
origin of his inventions; memory and fancy merge even in adults.”128 
Judge Hand returned to this point in his canonical opinion in Nichols  
v. Universal Pictures Corp., observing how hard it was to believe that the plaintiff 
playwright had not derived her two father characters from stock figures of low 
comedy.129 He also noted, without suggesting any intent to copy on the plaintiff’s 
part, that the basic plot of the plaintiff’s play was strongly evocative of Shakespeare’s 
Romeo and Juliet.130 Such classics are of course ubiquitous in the culture—the stuff 
of every high school curriculum and community theater production. Indeed, 
copyright jurisprudence permits evidence of “widespread dissemination” of an 
 
122. Id. at 136. 
123. Id. 
124. Fred Fisher, Inc., v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
125. See id. at 146 (“The composer swears that he did not use the copyrighted song in any way, 
so far as he is conscious, but arrived at the accompaniment independently . . . .”). 
126. Id. at 148. 
127. See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding  
that Michael Bolton unconsciously copied from a song by the Isley Brothers); ABKCO Music,  
Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that George Harrison 
unconsciously copied from a song by Ronald Mack). 
128. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936). 
129. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (“It is indeed 
scarcely credible that [the plaintiff] should not have been aware of those stock figures, the low comedy 
Jew and Irishman. The defendant has not taken from her more than their prototypes have contained 
for many decades. If so, obviously so to generalize her copyright, would allow her to cover what was 
not original with her.”). 
130. Id. at 122 (“A comedy based upon conflicts between Irish and Jews, into which the 
marriage of their children enters, is no more susceptible of copyright than the outline of Romeo and 
Juliet.”). 
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earlier work to help establish that the author of the later work had access to and 
copied it, purposefully or not.131 
Grounded in the premise that intertextuality is intrinsic to acts of authorship, 
the Copyright Act regulates how artists can use and interact with pre-existing 
copyrighted works. Copyright law thereby shapes the conditions for cultural 
production. It also shapes the conditions for dissemination of cultural works, with 
a focus on the public’s interest rather than the author’s intentions. Although 
copyright’s exclusive rights under U.S. law are personal to authors, they’re not about 
the personality of the author in a mystical or Romantic sense.132 The ultimate 
intended beneficiary of copyright is the public, which enjoys unrestricted access to 
creative works after the copyrights in them expire.133 Rewarding authors for their 
creative labor with a limited right to control the disposition of their works is thus a 
means to an end and not an end in itself.134 Consistent with the policy goal of 
promoting public dissemination, copyrights under U.S. law are freely alienable to 
encourage a robust market for creative works.135 
This predominantly utilitarian approach to copyright stands in marked 
contrast to the Continental natural-rights-based system, which Neil Netanel 
describes as having “a virulent personalist core of autonomy inalienabilities”136 that 
rests on a bedrock belief in the “inseverable personal connection between authors 
and their creations.”137 It is to this model of copyright authorship that DiModica 
appeals. To return to Bakhtin, however, the model of authorship encoded in the 
Copyright Act and propounded in cases going back to Emerson is non-monologic; 
the work of authorship under U.S. law is not conceptualized as “a hermetic and self-
sufficient whole” over which the author as progenitor should have full dominion.138 
It is rather, as Barthes wrote, “a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable 
centers of culture.”139 
 
131. See Loomis v. Cornish, 836 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2016) (“A copyright plaintiff . . . may 
establish a reasonable possibility of access by ‘showing that the plaintiff’s work has been widely 
disseminated’. . . . In most cases, the evidence of widespread dissemination centers on the degree of a 
work’s commercial success and on its distribution through radio, television, and other relevant 
mediums.”) (quoting Art Attacks Ink, LLC v. MGA Entm’t Inc., 581 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2009). 
132. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to grant exclusive rights to 
authors “to promote the progress of science and useful arts”). 
133. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The 
monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to 
provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public 
purpose may be achieved.”). 
134. See id. 
135. See Netanel, supra note 30 (asserting that Congress in the 1976 Act embraced a principle of 
unlimited alienability of copyright). 
136. Id. at 77. 
137. Id. at 5–6. 
138. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION, supra note 24, at 273. 
139. BARTHES, supra note 34, at 146. 
First to Printer_Bridy (1) (Do Not Delete) 1/28/2019  1:42 PM 
316 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:293 
A. Second-Degree Works and Second-Degree Uses 
Presupposing the dialogic nature of artistic production, the Copyright Act 
defines and protects a range of second-degree works and second-degree uses. These 
secondary works and uses depend directly and often focally on one or more existing 
works. Compilations, derivative works, collective works, and supplemental works 
are statutorily defined140 classes of texts that, in Kristeva’s words, “absorb” and 
“reply to” other texts in specific ways.141 Under the Copyright Act, authors of 
second-degree works can get exclusive rights in them, with the caveat mentioned 
above that material absorbed from the public domain or from another author lies 
outside the scope of those rights.142 Relatedly, copyright in a second-degree work is 
considered “strong” or “weak,” “thick” or “thin” according to how much of the 
work’s content can be regarded as originating with the author.143 Where the 
copyright in a work is weak or thin, an accused second-degree work will infringe 
only if it is virtually identical to the copyrighted work.144 
Specific second-degree uses defined as exceptions to copyright’s exclusivity 
fall primarily under the rubric of fair use (e.g., news reporting, criticism, and 
commentary)145 but are also covered in other places in the statute (e.g., the 
compulsory license to record “cover” versions of musical works).146 The 
compulsory license for musical works is somewhat restrictive, in that it requires the 
licensor to retain “the basic melody or fundamental character of the work” when 
making a new arrangement.147 The doctrine of fair use, by contrast, gives second-
degree authors considerably more flexibility in their intertextual engagements.148 
 
140. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “compilation,” “collective work,” “derivative work,” 
and “supplemental work”). 
141. Kristeva, supra note 23, at 39. 
142. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) (“The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends 
only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting 
material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The 
copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, 
or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material.”). 
143. See, e.g., Feist Pub’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (holding that 
the copyright in a factual compilation is thin); Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 107 
(2d Cir. 2014) (holding that the copyright in an architectural work containing many elements standard 
to the colonial style is “very thin”); Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 
F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding that the copyright in a rug combining the designs of two public 
domain rugs is thin); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a thin copyright in 
glass-in-glass sculptures of jellyfish because features of the plaintiff’s works were so commonplace to 
the medium). 
144. See Satava, 323 F.3d at 812 (“[A] thin copyright . . . protects against only virtually identical 
copying.”). 
145. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992). 
146. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010). 
147. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2). 
148. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) 
(explaining that Congress “resisted pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive 
categories of fair use.”); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-
2005, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 549, 557 (2008) (pointing out that the statutory limitations on copyright in 
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Uses beyond those specifically identified in the statute can be fair, with each case 
evaluated on its own merits.149 In furtherance of the policy that copyright should 
promote progress in the arts and sciences, second-degree authors who engage 
preexisting works in highly transformative ways have relatively wide latitude to do 
so without permission from right holders—and even against their wishes.150 
Without fair use, “unfaithful continuations” and other antagonistic intertexts would 
be subject to veto by authors whose aesthetics skew monologic. But as the Supreme 
Court said in Fisher v. Dees, “Copyright law is not designed to stifle critics.”151 Nor 
is it designed to protect authors from being discouraged or discredited.152 
Campbell vs. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., one of the only fair use cases to come before 
the Supreme Court, tested the scope of fair use in the creation of an unauthorized 
second-degree work.153 The dispute centered on a parodic rap hypertext of Roy 
Orbison’s classic rock song “Oh, Pretty Woman.”154 Acuff-Rose Music, which 
owns the copyright in the composition, sued the members of the band 2 Live Crew 
for creating and distributing a rap version of the song that reimagined Orbison’s 
dream girl as a streetwalker.155 When Acuff-Rose denied 2 Live Crew a license to 
incorporate music and lyrics from the song, the band members decided to proceed 
anyway, relying on fair use to shield them from liability for infringement.156 2 Live 
Crew’s parodic cover of the song, the Court explained, “juxtaposes the romantic 
musings of a man whose fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy 
demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility.”157 As Acuff-Rose 
surely recognized, the juxtaposition does Orbison no favors, reinterpreting the 
singer’s earnest romantic longing as thinly disguised lust. 
The Court in Campbell held that the band’s parodic purpose justified quoting 
the creative heart of Orbison’s song in order to conjure up the original in the minds 
of listeners.158 Citing the etymology of the word parody (“a song sung alongside 
another”), the Court explained that it would be impossible for 2 Live Crew’s 
 
sections 108 through 122 are “highly specific, even regulatory” in their language, whereas fair use is 
very broad). 
149. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994). 
150. See id. at 579 (“Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding 
of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation 
of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing 
space within the confines of copyright.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Pamela Samuelson, 
Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2619 (2009) (“Fair use defenses are generally 
successful in transformative and productive use cases as long as the defendants are careful about how 
much they take in relation to their purpose for doing so.”). 
151. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986). 
152. See id. at 437–38 (“‘Destructive’ parodies play an important role in social and literary 
criticism and thus merit protection even though they may discourage or discredit an original author.”). 
153. See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569. 
154. Id. at 571. 
155. Id. at 582. 
156. Id. at 572–73. 
157. Id. at 583. 
158. Id. at 588. 
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audience to recognize the band’s irreverent allusion to the original if the rap version 
didn’t directly quote the most recognizable elements of Orbison’s composition.159 
Justice Souter’s opinion Campbell is fully attentive to the generic requirements of 
parody—a literary undertaking that Genette defines as “the distortion of a text by 
means of . . . transformation.”160 
The Sixth Circuit panel in Campbell concluded that 2 Live Crew’s profane take 
on “Oh, Pretty Woman” wasn’t fair use because it presumptively harmed Acuff-
Rose’s potential market for licensed derivative works.161 Harm to markets for 
derivatives is a factor in the fair use analysis because the Copyright Act gives an 
author the exclusive right to prepare derivative works, which the statute defines as 
secondary works that “recast, transform, or modify” the copyrighted work in some 
way.162 The Court made clear in Campbell, however, that authorial control over 
derivatives does not extend to transformative works that right holders would be 
inclined to censor for reputational or other reasons.163 The Campbell Court thus 
interpreted the doctrine of fair use to function as a limit on the scope of the 
derivative work right where a second-degree author intentionally distorts a 
copyrighted work for the purpose of criticizing it. Given broad scope, the derivative 
work right could be a potent weapon in the hands of the monologic author, but the 
ultimate teaching of Campbell is that fair use protects second-degree authors who 
turn existing works against themselves. 
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.164 is a prime example of a post-Campbell 
case in which the doctrine of fair use shielded the creator of an unfaithful 
continuation from a claim of copyright infringement.165 The plaintiff was the trustee 
of Margaret Mitchell’s estate, which held the copyright in her best-selling novel Gone 
with the Wind (GWTW ).166 The defendant was the publisher of Alice Randall’s The 
Wind Done Gone (TWDG ).167 Randall wrote her novel, which borrowed heavily 
from GWTW, to deconstruct and criticize the racialized romanticism of Mitchell’s 
novel.168 After rehearsing a long litany of distinctive elements that Randall imported 
into her work from Mitchell’s novel, the court described TWDG as “an 
encapsulation of [GWTW] [that] exploit[s] its copyrighted characters, story lines, 
and settings as the palette for the new story.”169 There was no mistaking that 
 
159. Id. at 580. 
160. GENETTE, supra note 25, at 25. 
161. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. 
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “derivative work” to include “any other form in which 
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted”). 
163. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 597 (explaining that fair use “protects works we have reason to 
fear will not be licensed by copyright holders who wish to shield their works from criticism”). 
164. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
165. See id. at 1277 (vacating the district court’s preliminary injunction for Suntrust). 
166. Id. at 1259. 
167. Id. 
168. See id. (“Alice Randall . . . persuasively claims that her novel is a critique of GWTW’s 
depiction of slavery and the Civil-War era American South.”). 
169. Id. at 1267. 
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Randall’s work took a significant amount of protected expression from 
Mitchell’s.170 And there was no mistaking that Mitchell’s trustees did not like the 
use to which that borrowed expression had been put.171 
In much the same way that Fearless Girl intrudes upon the semiotic solitude 
of Charging Bull and asks viewers to see DiModica’s sculpture on Visbal’s terms, 
Randall’s novel contests the racial and cultural politics of GWTW. TWDG opens 
up GWTW to a new (and unwelcome) iteration. Houghton Mifflin characterized 
Randall’s work as an intertextual “inversion” of Mitchell’s hypotext: 
Houghton Mifflin argues that . . . [Randall’s] retelling of the story is an 
inversion of GWTW: the characters, places, and events lifted from GWTW 
are often cast in a different light, strong characters from the original are 
depicted as weak (and vice-versa) in the new work, the institutions and 
values romanticized in GWTW are exposed as corrupt in TWDG.172 
The fact that Randall inverted Mitchell’s story in the retelling could not 
prevent a finding that the two works were substantially similar for purposes of the 
infringement analysis.173 Much in Randall’s work was new, but much was also 
borrowed.174 Had the court’s decision in the case turned solely on the question of 
substantial similarity, Houghton Mifflin would have been liable for infringement.175 
The same was true of 2 Live Crew’s parody of “Oh, Pretty Woman.”176 
Fair use, however, ultimately won the day for Randall and her publisher, as it 
had for 2 Live Crew.177 In the fair use analysis, Randall’s confrontational dialogism 
made all the difference. When analyzing the purpose and character of Randall’s use, 
the court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell, which elevated the 
importance of intertextual transformation relative to other factors in the fair use 
analysis.178 The court emphasized Randall’s hostility to the racial ideology 
underlying Mitchell’s vision of the pre-Civil War south.179 Randall’s purpose, the 
 
170. See id. (“Our own review of the two works reveals substantial use of GWTW.”). 
171. See id. at 1259 (stating that Suntrust sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 
injunction to block distribution of Randall’s book). 
172. Id. at 1267. 
173. See id. (“While we agree with Houghton Mifflin that the characters, settings, and plot taken 
from GWTW are vested with a new significance when viewed through the character of Cynara in 
TWDG, it does not change the fact that they are the very same copyrighted characters, settings, and 
plot.”). 
174. See id. at 1270 (explaining that the last half of Randall’s book tells “a completely new story,” 
while the first part “flips” Mitchell’s story by telling it from Cynara’s perspective). 
175. Id. at 1267 (rejecting Houghton Mifflin’s argument that there was no substantial similarity 
between the two works). 
176. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574 (“It is uncontested here that 2 Live Crew’s song would be an 
infringement of Acuff–Rose’s rights in “Oh, Pretty Woman” . . . but for a finding of fair use through 
parody.”). 
177. See Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1277 (“Moreover, under the present state of the record, it appears 
that a viable fair use defense is available.”). 
178. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be 
the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”). 
179. See Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1270 (referring to Randall’s work as an “attack on GWTW”). 
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court wrote, was to “rebut and destroy . . . the mythology of GWTW [and to] 
explode the romantic, idealized portrait of the antebellum South.”180 The theme of 
intertextual inversion runs throughout the court’s discussion of fair use in the 
case.181 The opinion describes Randall’s protagonist, Cynara, as “the voice of 
Randall’s inversion of GWTW” and Cynara’s fictional diary as a parodic narrative 
that “flips GWTW’s traditional race roles.”182 In this and other fair use cases, the 
law’s solicitude for transformative intertextuality is linked directly to the copyright 
system’s underlying goals of promoting the public interest and progress in the 
arts.183 
Another important factor in the court’s decision was evidence in the case that 
Suntrust was using the copyright as a way of suppressing sequels containing speech 
with which Mitchell would have disagreed.184 The trustees argued that they were 
responsible for using the copyright to ensure “the appropriate cultivation of the 
franchise.”185 That “cultivation” included, for example, requiring authors of licensed 
derivative works to make no references to miscegenation or homosexuality.186 
Suntrust’s experts in the case testified that distribution of Randall’s work would 
“seriously taint the original” and prevent the trustees from “‘protect[ing] the 
reputation’ of their copyright.”187 In a separate special concurrence, Judge Marcus 
wrote to highlight the importance of fair use in preventing authors from using 
copyright to suppress speech intended to criticize them or their worldviews: 
“Suntrust may be vigilant of [GWTW’s] public image—but it may not use copyright 
to shield [GWTW] from unwelcome comments, a policy that would extend 
intellectual property protection ‘into the precincts of censorship.’”188 
Supreme Court cases similarly describe fair use as facilitating the production 
of second-degree works that copyright holders wouldn’t necessarily license. Fair use, 
the Court has said, creates “breathing space” for secondary uses189 and functions as 
“a form of subsidy—albeit at the first author’s expense—to permit the second 
author to make limited use of the first author’s work for the public good.”190 
 
180. Id. 
181. See, e.g., id. at 1270 (describing Randall’s work as an “inversion” of GWTW). 
182. Id. 
183. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts,  
is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures  
Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115 n.3 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Because the social good is served by increasing the supply 
of criticism—and thus, potentially, of truth—creators of original works cannot be given the power to 
block dissemination of critical derivative works.”). 
184. See Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1282 (discussing the testimony of Mitchell licensee Pat Conroy). 
185. Id. at 1276. 
186. See id. at 1282 (explaining licensing restrictions on the use of Mitchell’s works). 
187. Id. at 1280. 
188. Id. at 1283 (Marcus, J., specially concurring). 
189. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (describing fair use as a “guarantee of breathing space within the 
confines of copyright”). 
190. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984). 
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By specifically identifying criticism and commentary as examples of protected 
second-degree uses, the Copyright Act discourages the use of copyright to enforce 
authorial monologism in cases involving unfaithful continuations and other 
disputatious hypertexts. These types of second-degree uses are not protected 
categorically under the fair use standard—none are.191 But the statute puts a thumb 
on the scale in their favor, provided that the scope of intertextual borrowing is 
proportional to the critical work that second-degree authors set out to do.192 The 
court in Randall’s case discounted the harm that could come to Mitchell’s reputation 
from publication of a blasphemous sequel: “Destructive parodies play an important 
role in social and literary criticism and thus merit protection even though they may 
discourage or discredit an original author.”193 Beyond the very narrow context of 
moral rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), which will be discussed 
in Part VI below, copyright is not a tool for managing an author’s reputation.194 
There can be little doubt in light of Suntrust’s practice of using the copyright 
in GWTW to manage Mitchell’s authorial legacy that the trustees would never have 
granted a license for a hypertext like TWDG. Randall would have been liable as an 
infringer had her unfaithful continuation of Mitchell’s work not been defensible as 
fair use. She and other second-degree authors owe their freedom to recycle and 
rebut protected elements of other authors’ work to the American copyright system’s 
embrace of a plastic fair use doctrine that views productive and transformative 
second-degree uses as furthering the constitutional goal of progress in the arts.195 
The flexibility of the American conception of fair use is difficult (some might 
say impossible) to reconcile with the narrower and more categorical approach to 
exceptions and limitations in Continental copyright law.196 That tension is no 
 
191. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (“The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for 
the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.”). 
192. See Samuelson, supra note 150, at 2544 (“Most uses in the free speech/expression cluster 
[i.e., those involving criticism, commentary, and news reporting] are fair unless the second author has 
taken too much, undermined a core licensing market, or engaged in wrongful acts that undermined the 
claim of fair use.”). 
193. Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1283 (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
194. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Privacy laws, not copyright, 
may offer remedies tailored to Garcia’s personal and reputational harms.”); Leibovitz v. Paramount 
Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 116 n.7 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that damage to a photographer’s reputation 
vis-a-vis potential celebrity clients was not cognizable as a copyright harm); cf. Laura A. Heymann, The 
Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1343 (2011) (describing 
copyright as an area of the law that is not intended to provide redress for reputational harms but is 
often used for that purpose). 
195. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815 (2015) 
(discussing the evolution of the doctrine of fair use and the increased focus over time on the 
transformativeness of the disputed secondary use). 
196. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Flexible Copyright: Can the EU Author’s Rights Accommodate 
Fair Use?, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 276 (Ruth L. Okediji 
ed., 2017) (observing that “fair use in Europe is often regarded as an oxymoron or even a taboo in 
classic author’s rights doctrine”); Jane C. Ginsburg, Letter from the U.S.: Exclusive Rights, Exceptions, 
and Uncertain Compliance with International Norms—Part II (Fair Use) (Columbia Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 503, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2539178 [ https://perma.cc/XQ8M-
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accident; in Europe, copyright law is not required to accommodate the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of expression.197 U.S. courts have repeatedly 
described the fair use doctrine as a First Amendment safety valve in copyright 
law.198 U.S. copyright holders who look with envy on the control given to authors 
in the Continental copyright tradition view a broad scope for fair use as a bug in 
our domestic system.199 Given the utilitarian underpinnings of the U.S. system, 
however, fair use is much more accurately described as a feature. 
VI. BULLISH ON INTERTEXTS: DIMODICA’S CLAIMS ON THE MERITS 
In his demand letter to the City of New York, DiModica accused State Street 
of violating his moral right of integrity under section 106A of the Copyright Act—
VARA—and his right to prepare derivative works under section 106(2).200 
Evaluating his claims on their merits reveals the ways in which the U.S. copyright 
system accommodates the confrontational dialogism that Fearless Girl represents. 
Unlike Continental author’s rights laws, which codify a form of aesthetic 
monologism through strong moral rights protections and narrowly drawn 
exceptions, the U.S. copyright system gives unfaithful continuators like Visbal 
leeway to challenge the symbolism of the hypotexts they engage.201 
 
EAXZ] (suggesting that the current state of fair use law in the United States is incompatible with our 
international treaty obligations under the Berne Convention). 
197. Cf. Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1263 (“The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment, while 
intuitively in conflict, were drafted to work together to prevent censorship.”). 
198. See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 305 (2012) (describing fair use as a “speech-protective 
safeguard”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (describing fair use as a “built-in  
First Amendment accommodation”); see also Pierre N. Leval, Campbell as Fair Use Blueprint?, 90  
WASH. L. REV. 597, 614 (2015) (stating that “fair use serves as the First Amendment’s agent within the 
framework of copyright”). 
199. Cf. Justin Hughes, Fair Use and Its Politics—at Home and Abroad, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN 
AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, supra note 196, at 234 (exploring fair use as a site of 
ideological struggle between high protectionists, who prefer a narrow, rule-based approach to copyright 
limitations and exceptions, and low protectionists, who embrace the openness of the fair use standard). 
200. DiModica Demand Letter, supra note 14, at 3. 
201. Cf. Lior Zemer, Multivoiced Authors, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 383, 401 (2017) 
(arguing that a copyright system that “treats authors as the main source of creative expressions Holder, 
565 U.S. 302, 305 (2012) (describing fair use as a “speech-protective safeguard”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (describing fair use as a “built-in  
First Amendment accommodation”); see also Pierre N. Leval, Campbell as Fair Use Blueprint?, 90  
WASH. L. REV. 597, 614 (2015) (stating that “fair use serves as the First Amendment’s agent within the 
framework of copyright”). 
201. Cf. Justin Hughes, Fair Use and Its Politics—at Home and Abroad, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN 
AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, supra note 196, at 234 (exploring fair use as a site of 
ideological struggle between high protectionists, who prefer a narrow, rule-based approach to copyright 
limitations and exceptions, and low protectionists, who embrace the openness of the fair use standard). 
201. DiModica Demand Letter, supra note 14, at 3. 
” risks “institutionalizing a ‘power aspect’ according to which authors . . . limit newcomers from 
entering the market of creativity . . . lead[ing] [to] the monologization . . . of . . . our creative 
environment”). 
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A. Fearless Girl and the Right of Integrity Under VARA 
Through VARA, the Copyright Act grants moral rights of attribution and 
integrity for a narrow range of works produced in single copies or limited editions, 
including sculptures like Charging Bull and Fearless Girl.202 Under VARA, the right 
of integrity is defined as the author’s right to prevent others from intentionally 
distorting, mutilating, or otherwise modifying a covered work in a way that would 
be prejudicial to the artist’s reputation.203 To the extent that the right of integrity 
allows an artist to control second-degree uses of a protected work, it is a potential 
regulator of intertextuality as well as a limitation on what buyers can do with artwork 
they have purchased.204 
Antipathy to moral rights in the United States has a long pedigree.205 Writing 
in 1940 in the Harvard Law Review, Martin Roeder used the word “violent” to 
describe domestic opposition to the adoption of moral rights, which the Berne 
Convention requires for membership.206 When Congress finally passed the Berne 
Implementation Act of 1988, ending 100 years of U.S. resistance to joining the 
Berne Union, the Senate report expressly rejected moral rights doctrine.207 Before 
the enactment of VARA in 1990, the Copyright Act did not protect moral rights as 
such, although the right of public display and the right to prepare derivative works 
are sometimes discussed as limited doctrinal proxies.208 The United States putatively 
complied with its Berne obligation to protect the rights of attribution and integrity 
 
202. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “work of visual art” to include “sculpture, existing in 
a single copy, . . . or . . . in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are 
consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the 
author . . . .”); 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)–(2) (providing for the right of attribution); 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) 
(providing for the right of integrity). 
203. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (giving the author of a work of visual art, subject to specified 
limitations, the right “to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that 
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, 
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right”). VARA also includes a prohibition 
on “any destruction of a work of recognized stature.” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B). 
204. Cf. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 100 (1997) (describing moral rights as a continuing 
negative servitude on an art object). 
205. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82–83 (2d. Cir. 1995) (discussing historical 
resistance to moral rights doctrine in the federal courts and in Congress). 
206. Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors, 
and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940). 
207. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 8 (1988). 
208. See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 204, at 112–18 (discussing the public display right and 
the derivative work right as doctrinal alternatives to the right of integrity and arguing that passage of 
VARA foreclosed doctrinal evolution that might have expanded the scope of those rights). Notably, 
however, the first sale doctrine in section 109 of the Copyright Act prevents authors from  
exercising the public display right to control how copies of their works are displayed after sale. See 17  
U.S.C. § 109(c) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5), the owner of a particular copy 
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority 
of the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection of no more 
than one image at a time, to viewers present at the place where the copy is located.”). For discussion of 
the derivative work right as a potential proxy for the right of integrity, see infra Section VI.B. 
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through a patchwork of causes of action in other areas of the law, including 
defamation, privacy, and unfair competition.209 
Of the various moral rights recognized in Europe, it was the right of integrity, 
Roeder wrote, that “aroused the most bitter antagonism” in the United States.210 In 
France, that right included, and still includes, a specific prohibition against excessive 
criticism of an author’s work and a blanket prohibition against “all other injuries to 
the creator’s personality”—without regard to any public perception of harm to an 
author’s honor or reputation.211 It is easy to understand why domestic opposition 
to the right of integrity was so stiff. A personality right so broadly and subjectively 
defined conflicts openly with the expressive values embedded in the U.S. copyright 
system through the doctrine of fair use, which operates as a strong shield for 
criticism and commentary directed at creative works and their authors.212 The 
judicial opinions in Campbell and Suntrust forcefully communicate those values. In 
addition, to the extent that the right of integrity is treated in other jurisdictions as 
completely or partially inalienable, that policy conflicts with the economic-rights 
orientation of American copyright, which favors vigorous commerce in cultural 
works as a means of promoting the dissemination of knowledge.213 A broadly 
defined right of integrity supports a model of monologic authorship with a focus 
on protecting authorial personality that is not just foreign but also antithetical to 
fundamental U.S. copyright values.214 Consistent with this insight, a panel of 
Seventh Circuit judges once described VARA as “the stepchild of our copyright 
laws.”215 
In VARA’s legislative history, the House Judiciary Committee took pains to 
downplay the tension between the American view of copyright as a means of 
disseminating creative works for the public’s benefit and the Continental view of 
copyright as a means of protecting such works from what Roeder termed “the 
 
209. RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW 1075–76 (2012). 
210. Roeder, supra note 206, at 565. 
211. See id. at 556 (citing French cases from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); 
Cyrill Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 364–65 (2006) (explaining that 
France and Germany go beyond the requirements for protecting moral rights in Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention by decoupling the prohibition on modification from reputational harm or detriment to the 
artist). 
212. The mismatch is captured in Ralph E. Lerner and Judith Bresler’s characterization of moral 
rights as a “Procrustean imposition . . . on the economic underpinnings of U.S. intellectual property 
law.” LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 209, at 1113. 
213. See Netanel, supra note 30, at 48–60 (detailing the legal and practical limits on alienability 
under French and German law). 
214. Roberta Kwall argues that the parsimonious protection for moral rights under U.S. law is 
“out of step with global norms.” KWALL, supra note 31, at xvi. To the extent that that is true, the 
difference goes right to the heart of copyright’s constitutional justification, which is primarily to 
facilitate the creation and dissemination of creative works and only secondarily to protect the interests 
of authors. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive 
to create and disseminate ideas.”). 
215. Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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ravages of public use.”216 The committee’s report on VARA emphasizes the 
“extreme lengths” to which VARA’s drafters went “to very narrowly define the 
works of art that will be covered.”217 With respect to the scope of the rights of 
attribution and integrity in VARA, the committee assured readers that the statute’s 
protections were tailored to “in no way interfere with ordinary commerce in works 
of art by art dealers, auction houses, and others similarly situated.”218 VARA 
protects artists, the report states, “without inhibiting the rights of copyright owners 
and users, and without undue interference with the successful operation of the 
American copyright system.”219 In addition, the report notes, VARA rights, like all 
other rights under the Copyright Act, are subject to the safety valve of fair use.220 
Moral rights under U.S. law are thus very limited in comparison with their 
French and German counterparts.221 For example, VARA’s rights of attribution and 
integrity may be waived by creators of covered works,222 and such rights never vest 
as an initial matter in creators of works made for hire.223 Of particular relevance in 
DiModica’s case, the right of integrity under VARA is limited to the prevention of 
modifications that compromise the physical integrity of a copy of the protected 
work.224 To distinguish an actionable modification from a non-actionable one, the 
committee’s report on VARA contrasts the act of putting Christmas decorations on 
a sculpture (a non-actionable modification) with that of cutting a Picasso print into 
a hundred pieces to increase resale value (an actionable modification).225 In MASS 
MoCA v. Büchel, the First Circuit held that exhibiting a work in an unfinished state 
and partially draping it with tarps caused the work to “look different” but did not 
 
216. Roeder, supra note 206, at 557. 
217. H.R. REP. NO. 101–514, at 11 (1990). The definition of “work of visual art” expressly 
excludes “any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture 
or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information 
service, electronic publication, or similar publication; (ii) any merchandising item or advertising, 
promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging material or container; (iii) any portion or part of any 
item described in clause (i) or (ii); (B) any work made for hire; or (C) any work not subject to copyright 
protection under this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
218. H.R. REP. NO. 101–514, at 13 (1990). 
219. Id. at 10. 
220. Id. at 13. 
221. See Netanel, supra note 30, at 26 (stating that “United States moral right analogues fall short 
of the more stringent French and German provisions”). Proponents of strong domestic moral rights 
have suggested that VARA’s protections are insufficient to comply with international treaty obligations 
under the Berne Convention. See KWALL, supra note 31, at 37 (stating that “we may not be in compliance 
with our obligations under the Berne Convention”); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship 
in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 HOUSTON L. REV. 263, 286 (2004) (suggesting that the right 
of attribution under VARA is not sufficiently generalized for Berne compliance). 
222. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (“The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not be transferred, 
but those rights may be waived if the author expressly agrees to such waiver in a written instrument 
signed by the author.”). 
223. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A work of visual art does not include . . . any work made for 
hire . . . .”). 
224. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 209, at 1091 (asserting that distorted depictions of a 
work are not actionable if the work itself remains intact). 
225. H.R. REP. NO. 101–514, at 15. 
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amount to intentional distortion or mutilation.226 In English v. BFC&R East 11th 
St. LLC, a district court in New York held that obstructing the view of a mural by 
constructing a building on an adjoining lot was not actionable as mutilation or 
destruction under VARA because the mural would not be physically damaged or 
altered in any way by the construction.227 In sum, VARA’s right of integrity protects 
artists only against physical harm to copies of their works. 
Roberta Kwall conceptualizes the right of integrity much more broadly—as 
functioning to “safeguard the author’s meaning and message,” which she refers to 
as a work’s “textual integrity.”228 Conceived in this way, the right of integrity is about 
something more than protecting the work as a physical object; it is a way to control 
the work as a semiotic object, which is precisely what DiModica wants to do—and 
believes he can do—by cutting off the intertextual dialogue between Fearless Girl 
and Charging Bull. My own view of this belief comports with Amy Adler’s: it is 
rooted in a naïve theory of interpretation that denies and devalues the varied 
meanings that readers, viewers, and listeners bring to their experience and 
understanding of creative works.229 A right of integrity so broadly defined also 
seems impossible to enforce for works like Charging Bull that are installed in busy, 
open, public spaces. Lior Zemer argues that “[u]rban art, as an engagement with the 
public, creates a bridge between artists and unsolicited viewers—a continuous 
invitation to converse with the work.”230 Attempting to silence or limit that 
conversation in the middle of one of the world’s noisiest and most dynamic cities is 
bound to be a losing battle. 
Both legislative history and litigated cases make it clear that VARA’s right of 
integrity is not drawn broadly enough to protect what Kwall defines as textual 
integrity.231 It does not give artists the right to prevent so-called contextual 
modifications—defined as those that “leave the substance of the work intact, but 
change the appearance or perception of the work by putting it into a context that 
differs from the one originally intended or envisioned by the author.”232 This 
limitation, known as the public presentation exception, was written into VARA for 
the purpose of protecting the “normal discretion” of museums, galleries, 
auctioneers, and other participants in the art market “to light, frame, and place 
works of art.”233 Specifically, the statute provides that “[t]he modification of a work 
 
226. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 61 (1st  
Cir. 2010). 
227. English v. BFC & R E. 11th St. LLC, No. 97 CIV. 7446 (HB), 1997 WL 746444, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997), aff’d sub nom. English v. BFC Partners, 198 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 1999). 
228. KWALL, supra note 31, at 1, 6. 
229. Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263, 277–78 (2009). 
230. Lior Zemer, Dialogical Transactions, 95 OR. L. REV. 141, 214 (2016). 
231. See Büchel, 593 F.3d at 61; H.R. REP. NO. 101–514, at 15 (1990); LERNER & BRESLER, supra 
note 209, at 1091 (asserting that distorted depictions of a work are not actionable if the work itself 
remains intact). 
232. Rigamonti, supra note 211, at 365. 
233. H.R. REP. NO. 101–514, at 17. 
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of visual art which is the result of . . . the public presentation, including lighting and 
placement, of the work is not [actionable] unless the modification is caused by gross 
negligence.”234 The public presentation exception is what permits museum curators 
to assemble collections and mount exhibits featuring the works of multiple artists 
displayed in close proximity to one another. Adler argues that curators performing 
these functions are themselves artists whose creative vision should not be limited 
by the supposed intentions of the artists whose works they display.235 
DiModica alleges in his demand letter that the placement of Fearless Girl 
violates his right of integrity by intentionally distorting the meaning and message of 
Charging Bull.236 Given VARA’s focus on physical modifications, however, and its 
inclusion of the public presentation exception, DiModica’s claim is . . . bull. To the 
extent that Fearless Girl’s presence in Bowling Green Park modifies the meaning 
of Charging Bull for either DiModica himself or members of the public, that 
modification in no way violates DiModica’s right of integrity under VARA. If the 
right of integrity under VARA were broad enough to protect Kwall’s conception of 
“textual integrity,” DiModica would have a stronger case. Similarly, if DiModica 
were bringing his claim abroad, where simply reframing a work can amount to an 
actionable moral rights violation, he might prevail in his demand for a court order 
forcing the removal of Fearless Girl.237 As it is, U.S. law does not extend protection 
to the contextual integrity of works covered under VARA. In that regard, it is 
protective of second-degree authors like Visbal who confront and recontextualize 
the work of predecessors, modifying the meaning of that work profoundly but from 
an arm’s length. 
B. Fearless Girl and the Right to Prepare Derivative Works 
The exclusive right under the Copyright Act that most directly limits the 
production of second-degree texts in the form of continuations and sequels is the 
right to prepare derivative works. The derivative work right is doctrinally adjacent 
to the right of integrity in that it gives authors the right to control subsequent 
 
234. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (2012). 
235. See Adler, supra note 229, at 278 (“I propose that the curator (along with the ‘original’ artist) 
is always an author of the art she displays. From the initial act of choosing to place an object in an art 
setting, to deciding on its lighting or placement, all curatorial choices change the meaning of a work.”). 
236. See DiModica Demand Letter, supra note 14, at 3. DiModica created Charging Bull before 
VARA took effect in 1990, but the statute covers works created before its effective date for which title 
had not been transferred from the author as of the effective date. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(2) (“With 
respect to works of visual art created before the effective date set forth in section 610(a) of the Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990, but title to which has not, as of such effective date, been transferred from 
the author, the rights conferred by subsection (a) shall be coextensive with, and shall expire at the same 
time as, the rights conferred by section 106.”). 
237. See Rigamonti, supra note 211, at 365–66 (citing a German high court case in which adding 
customized frames to paintings that extended the patterns in them was held to violate the right of 
integrity). 
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authors’ adaptations and transformations of their works.238 The Copyright Act of 
1976 defines a derivative work as “a work based upon one or more preexisting 
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted.”239 The derivative work right was not new to the Copyright Act of 1976, 
but its scope was considerably narrower under the Copyright Acts of 1870 and 
1909.240 Paul Goldstein attributes the expansion over time to the growth of the film 
and television industries, whose profitability is largely driven by franchises and 
merchandising.241 
The preparation of a typical derivative work involves the reproduction or 
performance of a substantial amount of material from the preexisting work on 
which the derivative is based.242 Based on this fact, Nimmer’s treatise takes the 
position that the derivative work right is redundant; anyone who infringes it 
simultaneously infringes either the right of reproduction or the right of public 
performance.243 If Nimmer is correct in his understanding of the interrelationship 
between the derivative work right and the rights of reproduction and performance, 
then DiModica’s derivative work claim must fail. As discussed above, Visbal copied 
nothing from Charging Bull when she created Fearless Girl, so there is no 
infringement of the reproduction right connected to Fearless Girl’s presence.244 
And she can’t have infringed DiModica’s right of public performance, because there 
is no such right for sculptural works.245 By Nimmer’s logic, Visbal and State Street 
did nothing that could be construed as creating a derivative work “based upon” 
Charging Bull.246 
 
238. See id. at 368–69 (discussing how moral rights can sometimes be vindicated through the 
assertion of economic rights). 
239. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
240. See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 211–15 (1983) (explaining the evolution of the derivative work right under U.S. law). 
241. Id. at 209. 
242. See, e.g., Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 988 F. Supp. 2d 879, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2013), 
aff’d, 755 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that ten short stories incorporating the characters of Sherlock 
Holmes and Dr. Watson are derivative works of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s first Sherlock Holmes story); 
Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 68 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (holding that a novel that continues the story of Catcher in the Rye and its protagonist, Holden 
Caulfield, is a derivative work). 
243. See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.09 (2017) (describing the adaptation right as 
“superfluous”). 
244. See supra Part II. 
245. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (providing an exclusive right to publicly perform “literary, 
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works”). 
246. See NIMMER, supra note 243, § 8.09 (“[I]f the latter work does not incorporate enough of 
the pre-existing work to constitute an infringement of either the reproduction right or of the 
performance right, then it likewise will not infringe the right to make derivative works because no 
derivative work will have resulted.”). 
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There are, however, some cases involving derivative work claims that implicate 
the display right rather than the reproduction and performance rights. The plaintiffs 
in these cases alleged that the defendants created infringing derivative works by 
altering the appearance of their copyrighted works through acts or processes of 
visual incorporation that did not involve copying. Three of these cases involved 
mounting and laminating art prints onto tiles for sale as wall plaques.247 In Mirage 
Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., the Ninth Circuit found an infringement of 
the right to prepare derivative works where the defendant removed selected pages 
from a coffee table book of Patrick Nagel prints, mounted the prints individually 
onto ceramic tiles, and sold the tiles at retail.248 The defendant in the case argued 
that the preparation of a derivative work must entail reproduction of the underlying 
work.249 The court disagreed, holding that the defendant “recast or transformed the 
individual images by incorporating them into its tile-preparing process” and thereby 
created an infringing derivative work without making a copy.250 In Munoz v. 
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., a later, unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit reached the 
same result on the same facts without any further analysis.251 
In Lee v. A.R.T. Co., however, the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite 
conclusion about the putatively transformative nature of the defendant’s tile 
mounting process.252 “No one,” the court wrote, “believes that a museum violates 
§ 106(2) every time it changes the frame of a painting.”253 That is true, the court 
explained, “although the choice of frame or glazing affects the impression the art 
conveys.”254 The Seventh Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view in Mirage Editions 
that mounting a work on a tile transforms or changes it in any actionable way.255 It 
declined to interpret the scope of the derivative work right to give artists control 
over “any alteration of a work, however slight.”256 To give artists that degree of 
control, Judge Easterbrook wrote, would impermissibly expand the scope of 
authors’ moral rights under U.S. law beyond the narrow scope that Congress 
 
247. Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(finding a violation of the right to prepare derivative works); Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 38 
F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding no violation). 
248. Mirage Editions, 856 F.2d at 1342. 
249. See id. at 1343 (“Appellant’s contention that since it has not engaged in ‘art reproduction’ 
and therefore its tiles are not derivative works is not fully dispositive of this issue.”). 
250. Id. at 1344. 
251. Muñoz, 38 F.3d at 1218 (“A.R.T. does not dispute it used the same tiling process disputed 
in Mirage Editions. Under the holding in Mirage Editions, the ceramic tiles incorporating the Rie Muñoz 
prints clearly constitute a derivative work. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding the 
tiles infringed on Muñoz’s copyrights pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).”). 
252. See Lee, 125 F.3d at 583 (declining to follow Muñoz and Mirage Editions). 
253. Id. at 581. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 582 (“Yet the copyrighted note cards and lithographs were not ‘transformed’ in the 
slightest. The art was bonded to a slab of ceramic, but it was not changed in the process. It still depicts 
exactly what it depicted when it left Lee’s studio.”). 
256. Id. 
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intended when it enacted VARA.257 As discussed in Part VI.A above, the right of 
integrity under VARA does not protect the contextual integrity of a work or allow 
an artist to control her work’s public presentation. In these respects, VARA can be 
read—as the Seventh Circuit read it—to implicitly limit the reach of the derivative 
work right. 
Although the panel in Lee recognized that its decision created a circuit split 
with Mirage Editions, the Seventh Circuit did not elect to rehear the case en banc, and 
the issue has never come before the Supreme Court for resolution.258 As between 
the two approaches, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning better serves the overall goals 
of copyright because it considers the very real potential for conflict between a broad 
application of the derivative work right (i.e., one that would allow artists to control 
non-reproductive, physically incorporative uses) and the purposefully narrow scope 
of VARA’s right of integrity. Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli have argued that 
VARA’s enactment effectively foreclosed the development of doctrinal alternatives 
to moral rights under U.S. law, including a more expansively defined derivative 
work right.259 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Lee supports that argument. 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Mirage Editions predated VARA, so the court 
in that case could not have considered the interaction between VARA and the 
derivative work right with respect to the prevention of what artists take to be 
prejudicial distortions of their works. The court could have revisited its reasoning 
from Mirage Editions in Muñoz, which post-dated VARA, but it elected not to. 
However, in the time between Mirage Editions and Muñoz, another panel of the 
Ninth Circuit considered the scope of the derivative work right in Lewis Galoob Toys, 
Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.260 
Nintendo sued Galoob over the Game Genie, a video game enhancement 
device for use with Nintendo’s cartridge-based TV gaming system.261 The Game 
Genie allowed the player of a Nintendo game to manipulate up to three features of 
the game during the course of play.262 For example, the Game Genie could increase 
the number of lives of the player’s character, increase the character’s speed, and 
allow the character to float above obstacles.263 The player controlled the changes 
made by the Game Genie by entering codes provided in a programming manual 
and code book provided by Galoob.264 The court held that the Game Genie did not 
create derivative works of Nintendo’s copyrighted video game displays, because the 
 
257. Id. at 583 (“It would not be sound to use § 106(2) to provide artists with exclusive rights 
deliberately omitted from the Visual Artists Rights Act.”). 
258. Id. at 583 n.2 (“Because this opinion creates a conflict among the circuits, it has been 
circulated to all judges in active service. See Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge requested a hearing en banc.”). 
259. See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 204, at 112–16 (discussing doctrinal alternatives to the 
right of integrity). 
260. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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preparation of a derivative work requires the physical incorporation of portions of 
the plaintiff’s work.265 The fact that the use of the Game Genie altered the player’s 
experience of the game and the appearance of the plaintiff’s audiovisual displays did 
not lead the court to find a violation of the derivative work right.266 The court 
analogized the Game Genie to a kaleidoscope, which changes the appearance of a 
protected artwork work seen through it but does not thereby create a derivative 
work.267 
A New York district court in 1-800Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com reached the 
same conclusion about the alteration of the appearance of a computer display.268 
The case involved pop-up advertisements displayed over web pages in Internet 
browsers.269 Relying on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Lee, the court in  
1-800Contacts held that changing the appearance of a website by obscuring part of 
it underneath a pop-up window did not create a derivative work of the underlying 
website.270 The court explained that the pop-up ads did not “recast, transform, or 
adapt” the plaintiff’s website because the website remained intact on the user’s 
screen underneath the pop-up.271 Moreover, the court said, a holding that the 
temporary superimposition of one window over another on a computer screen 
would turn every multitasking computer user into an infringer of one or more 
derivative work rights.272 Such a result, the court said, would be “jarring.”273 
DiModica’s claim belongs to this class of derivative work cases involving 
alteration to the appearance of a copyrighted work without reproduction or physical 
incorporation of any material from the protected work. DiModica’s letter to the city 
alleges that when Visbal and State Street placed Fearless Girl in the path of Charging 
Bull, they effectively created a new work that completely incorporates 
DiModica’s.274 But the incorporation DiModica alleges consists entirely of an 
alteration to the public’s perception of Charging Bull. The public can now see 
Charging Bull as part of a larger composition, but nothing about Charging Bull has 
 
265. See id. at 967–68 (“The examples of derivative works provided by the Act all physically 
incorporate the underlying work or works. The Act’s legislative history similarly indicates that ‘the 
infringing work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form.’”). 
266. See id. at 969 (stating that the Game Genie “can only enhance, and cannot duplicate or 
recaste, a Nintendo game’s output”). 
267. See id. (“For example, although there is a market for kaleidoscopes, it does not necessarily 
follow that kaleidoscopes create unlawful derivative works when pointed at protected artwork. The 
same can be said of countless other products that enhance, but do not replace, copyrighted works.”). 
268. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 487–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d 
on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005). 
269. Id. at 487. 
270. See id. (“Defendants’ pop-up ads may ‘obscure’ or ‘cover’ a portion of Plaintiff’s website—
but they do not ‘change’ the website, and accordingly do not ‘recast, transform or adapt’ the website.”). 
271. Id. 
272. See id. at 487–88 (“A definition of ‘derivative work’ that sweeps within the scope of the 
copyright law a multi-tasking Internet shopper whose word-processing program obscures the screen 
display of Plaintiff’s website is . . . not supported by the definition set forth at 17 U.S.C. § 101.”). 
273. Id. 
274. DiModica Demand Letter, supra note 14, at 1–2. 
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been physically co-opted or incorporated in any way. In fact, there are angles of 
view from which Charging Bull is visible but Fearless Girl is not. Physically, 
DiModica’s work remains untouched, even though it has been visually incorporated 
and thereby semiotically transformed. Under existing case law, the derivative work 
right doesn’t reach this kind of virtual incorporation. And, as the Seventh Circuit 
explained in Lee, that result is consistent with VARA’s limiting the right of integrity 
to exclude contextual modifications. 
Even if a court were to be persuaded that State Street’s placement of Fearless 
Girl in Charging Bull’s path somehow created a derivative work, the creation of that 
work would almost certainly be a protected fair use. Suntrust, which was discussed 
at length in Part V above, is a closely analogous case involving an unfaithful 
continuation of a copyright-protected work. From a fair use perspective, Visbal’s 
hypertextual incorporation of Charging Bull is both critical and transformative.275 
Fearless Girl was created to symbolically contest the culture of masculine corporate 
power that Charging Bull can be read to represent. With respect to the purpose and 
character of Visbal’s use, DiModica’s gripe that Fearless Girl radically transforms 
the meaning of Charging Bull is actually an argument in Visbal’s favor.276 Moreover, 
to the extent that Fearless Girl’s presence could be seen as diminishing the value  
of Charging Bull, the harm at issue is reputational and not economic.277 Campbell 
emphasizes that copyright is not intended to protect authors from the reputational 
harm that results from harsh criticism.278 
CONCLUSION 
Arturo DiModica’s complaint about the placement of Fearless Girl and its 
allegedly harmful effect on Charging Bull’s artistic integrity will likely never wind up 
in court. Nevertheless, the very public dispute over these two highly visible works 
has raised some novel questions about the scope of U.S. copyright law and its role 
as a regulator of author-to-author and work-to-work interactions in the art world. 
Just how much control over the public presentation of a work of art does copyright 
give an artist? Seeking an answer to that question through the narratological 
concepts of dialogism and intertextuality reveals fundamental—and, in DiModica’s 
case, legally dispositive—differences between the U.S. copyright system and its 
Continental counterparts. 
 
275. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (defining a 
transformative work as one that “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message”). 
276. See id. at 579 (stating that “the more transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use”). 
277. It is difficult to assess harm to the market in a case involving a work that exists in a single 
copy and for which there is no established market and no record of a past sale. 
278. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (distinguishing between “potentially remediable displacement 
and unremediable disparagement”). 
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Whereas U.S. copyright law aims primarily to promote commerce in creative 
works by legitimizing a wide range of second-degree works and uses, Continental 
copyright law aims primarily to protect authorial personality by giving authors far-
reaching control over how creative second-comers interact with their works. The 
Fearless Girl/Charging Bull controversy highlights how consequential the 
difference is and offers an important lesson for policy makers: caution is warranted 
when contemplating alterations to the contours of domestic copyright law in the 
interest of international harmonization. Our copyright law diverges from its 
Continental counterparts for reasons that go to the heart of the Constitution’s 
justification for granting the copyright monopoly. 
In his letter to the city, DiModica asserted his prerogative as an artist to 
prevent another artist from interfering with the meaning he wants his work to 
convey to the public. As this Article has shown, his claim finds no traction in the 
U.S. Copyright Act. Visbal’s sculpture confronts Charging Bull both physically and 
symbolically. Its placement “writes” Charging Bull into a visual narrative about 
gender and power that DiModica doesn’t like. It supplements Charging Bull in the 
Derridean sense of a surplus that displaces. What it doesn’t do while doing all of that 
is infringe DiModica’s copyright. From the perspective of promoting progress in 
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